



Don’t Daze, Phase, or Lase Me, Bro!  Fourth 
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Nonlethal Weapons, and Why Requiring an 
Injury Cannot Withstand a Constitutional or 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a person in agonizing pain.  He cannot move.  He cannot 
remember where he is or what he was doing before this moment.  He 
cannot focus on anything but this piercing, all-encompassing sensation 
and his inability to control his body.  Just as he begins to come around, 
the pain explodes again. 
Gradually, the feelings subside.  He hears shouting as he regains his 
bearings and realizes he is in handcuffs.  Slowly, he begins to piece 
together what happened. 
He approached a stop sign in an unfamiliar part of town.  Out of the 
corner of his eye, he saw a police officer turn on her lights and siren.  
After stopping his car, he got out to ask the officer for directions.  As he 
approached her car, she jumped out, pointed an unusual-looking rifle at 
him, and ordered him to stop.  Unbeknownst to him, his car was similar 
to one that had recently been used in a bank robbery.  Confused, he 
continued to approach the officer’s car, and she discharged her weapon.  
He remembers struggling to stay on his feet and escape the weapon’s 
reach.  As he struggled, the police officer discharged her weapon again. 
As a result of his experience, he files a lawsuit alleging that the 
officer used more force than was necessary under the circumstances.   
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The court, however, dismisses the lawsuit because the weapon did not 
inflict more than an indeterminate amount of injury. 
The Supreme Court has articulated a test for analyzing Fourth 
Amendment excessive-force claims that focuses solely on the 
reasonableness of the force used by a police officer when detaining a 
suspect.1  Nonetheless, some circuit and district courts have added an 
additional requirement.  Though constitutionally deficient and practically 
untenable, some courts require arrestees to also establish that they 
suffered an injury as a result of the Fourth Amendment violation.  In 
addition, some courts have determined that a de minimis injury is 
insufficient to state a cause of action for excessive force under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Because an analysis of the amount of injury an arrestee 
sustained lacks both a constitutional and pragmatic foundation, courts 
have developed a confusing patchwork of unconstitutional tests and 
considerations.  As domestic police forces increase their use of nonlethal 
weapons, the courts’ focus on the arrestee’s injury and recognition of a 
de minimis injury exception to Fourth Amendment excessive-force 
claims linger as unconstitutional anachronisms.  They fail to consider not 
only the Supreme Court’s excessive-force jurisprudence, but also the 
deceptively minimal harm caused by current and future nonlethal 
weapons. 
This Article has two primary parts.  Part II begins with a discussion 
of the advent and use of the de minimis injury exception to Fourth 
Amendment excessive-force claims.  Inseparably intertwined with the 
exception is some courts’ requirement that an arrestee who alleges 
excessive force must also have suffered an injury.  Thus, Part II 
continues by exploring how the circuits analyze Fourth Amendment 
excessive-force claims in relation to their requiring that a claimant allege 
an injury.  The discussion highlights not only the lack of constitutional 
support for an injury requirement and a de minimis injury exception, but 
also the jurisprudential disorder created by these facets of the analysis.  
Part III discusses nonlethal weapons.  It spotlights the physiological, 
psychological, and intersubjectively reliable experiences suffered by 
victims of current and future nonlethal weapons.  Part III concludes by 
discussing why, in light of new nonlethal-weapon technology, a de 
minimis injury exception to Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims is 
impractical and should be abandoned. 
                                                          
 1. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
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II. THE DE MINIMIS INJURY EXCEPTION TO FOURTH AMENDMENT 
EXCESSIVE-FORCE CLAIMS MUST BE ABANDONED BECAUSE IT 
LACKS A CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS  
A. Introduction to Excessive-Force Claims 
In 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal law provides a remedy for excessive-
force claims based on the deprivation of a victim’s constitutional rights.2  
While all excessive-force analyses contemplate similar interests, the 
examination of constitutional excessive-force claims is not a monolithic 
inquiry, applicable across the spectrum of circumstances.  As a result, 
when addressing an excessive-force claim under § 1983, a court must 
begin its analysis “by identifying the specific constitutional right 
allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force.”3  Three 
different constitutional protections may apply.4  Courts choose the 
applicable protection based on an analysis of whether the alleged victim 
is “an arrestee, a pretrial detainee, or a convicted inmate of a penal 
institution.”5  Since 1985, the Fourth Amendment has governed 
excessive-force allegations made in the context of an arrest.6  Excessive-
force claims by pretrial detainees who are in state custody are subject to 
the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis.7  Convicted 
criminals’ excessive-force claims are examined under the Eighth 
Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.8 
While this Article discusses Fourth Amendment excessive-force 
claims, a cursory understanding of the tests courts use to analyze claims 
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments is beneficial.9  To 
                                                          
 2. See, e.g., Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 505 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Kneipp v. 
Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
 3. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394 (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979)). 
 4. See id. at 395 n.10 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 520–39 (1979); quoting Whitley v. 
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1980)); Kinney v. Ind. Youth Ctr., 950 F.2d 462, 465 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 394, 395 n.10, 397); Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 147–48 (7th Cir. 
1990). 
 5. Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1060 (8th Cir. 2001); see Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10 
(citing Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535–39; quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327). 
 6. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 
U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). 
 7. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 392–95, 395 n.10 (citing Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535–39). 
 8. Id. at 395 n.10 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327). 
 9. Cf. Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 401 (5th Cir. 2004) (emphasizing that “‘cases 
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establish an excessive-force claim under the Eighth Amendment, a 
prisoner must demonstrate that the force was “sadistically and 
maliciously applied for the very purpose of causing harm.”10  Notably, an 
analysis of excessive-force claims under the Eighth Amendment differs 
from an analysis under the Fourth Amendment because Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence contemplates the physical punishment of 
convicted prisoners and the intent to cause harm.11  In contrast, Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence contemplates the right to be free from 
unreasonable, forcible seizure that restrains a citizen’s liberty.12 
The applicable test for pretrial detainees’ Fourteenth Amendment 
excessive-force claims, however, is less clear.  For example, the Fourth 
Circuit has determined that the analysis of Fourteenth Amendment 
excessive-force claims is no different than the aforementioned analysis 
of Eighth Amendment claims.13  In contrast, the Sixth and Seventh 
Circuits have indicated that analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause may grant pretrial detainees more protection than the 
Eighth Amendment.14  The Seventh Circuit, for example, reasoned that 
pretrial detainees who have not been found guilty of any crime “may not 
be ‘punished’ by the state in any way.”15  As a result, pretrial detainees in 
the Seventh Circuit must prove that a police officer “acted deliberately or 
with callous indifference, evidenced by an actual intent to violate [the 
plaintiff’s] rights or reckless disregard for his rights.”16 
                                                                                                                       
arising under one amendment have consistently affected the parameters of rights that, while arising 
under different constitutional amendments, implicate similar policy concerns’” (quoting Petta v. 
Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 914 n.31 (5th Cir. 1998))). 
 10. Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 11. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1992); Graham, 490 U.S. at 392–94. 
 12. See Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1444 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Wilkins v. May, 872 
F.2d 190, 192–93 (7th Cir. 1989)). See also Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10. 
 13. See Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 446–48 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 14. See Griffin v. Hardrick, 604 F.3d 949, 953 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Lewis v. Downey, 581 
F.3d 467, 475 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
 15. Wilson v. Williams, 83 F.3d 870, 875 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 
520, 535 (1979)). 
 16. Anderson v. Gutschenritter, 836 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Shelby Cty. Jail 
Inmates v. Westlake, 798 F.2d 1085, 1094 (7th Cir. 1986)). 
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B. The History of De Minimis Injury in the Context of Fourth 
Amendment Excessive-Force Claims 
1. Graham: The Fourth Amendment Is Applicable to Excessive-Force 
Claims Arising Within the Context of an Arrest 
Before 1989, several circuits recognized that the Fourth Amendment 
governed an arrestee’s excessive-force claim,17 while other circuits 
analyzed all excessive-force claims within the context of substantive due 
process.18  In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court validated the 
former principle when it held that the Fourth Amendment “governs a free 
citizen’s claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the 
course of making an arrest.”19  In Graham, the Court determined that a 
Fourth Amendment excessive-force analysis was one of “objective 
reasonableness.”20  As the Court articulated, the analysis focuses on the 
police officer’s actions and whether those actions were “‘objectively 
reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [the 
officer], without regard to [the officer’s] underlying intent or 
motivation.”21  As a police officer’s “right to make an arrest or 
investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree 
of physical coercion,”22 the analysis requires a balancing of “the nature 
and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment 
interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.”23  
The factors courts must consider include “the severity of the crime at 
issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the 
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or 
attempting to evade arrest by flight.”24 
                                                          
 17. See Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that “the Fourth 
Amendment governs not only whether a person or thing is subject to a ‘seizure,’ but also ‘the 
manner in which a . . . seizure is conducted.’”  (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–8 
(1984)))  See also Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1987); Robins v. Harum, 
773 F.2d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 18. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989) (finding that most lower federal courts 
applied a substantive due process test to excessive force claims). 
 19. Id. at 388. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 397 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137–39 (1978); Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). 
 22. Id. at 396 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22–27). 
 23. Id. (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 8) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 24. Id. (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9). 
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Notably, in articulating the analytical framework for an analysis of 
Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims, the Court did not examine 
the magnitude of the arrestee’s injury.  Indeed, the very test the district 
court and Fourth Circuit adopted in Graham v. City of Charlotte—which 
the Court rejected—included, among other things, an examination of the 
“extent of the injury inflicted” upon the arrestee.25  Instead, the Court’s 
analysis focused on the police officer’s actions, the “reasonableness” of 
the particular force employed, and the objective reasonableness of the 
type of force under the circumstances.26  To be sure, “its opinion . . . 
contains no quantum-of-injury criterion.”27  Paradoxically, one of the 
Court’s axioms often cited in support of a de minimis injury exception—
“‘[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the 
peace of a judge’s chambers violates the Fourth Amendment’”28—
focused on the amount of force, not on the arrestee’s injury. 
2. The Genesis of De Minimis Injury Lexicon Within the Context of 
Fourth Amendment Excessive-Force Claims 
The phrase “de minimis injury” first appeared within the context of a 
Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, three months before the Supreme Court issued its Graham 
decision.29  In Iafrate v. Globosits, the plaintiff alleged that his arresting 
officer used excessive force in violation of his federal constitutional 
rights.30  While arresting the plaintiff for violating the local loitering 
ordinance, the officer allegedly shoved the plaintiff into the police 
cruiser’s door several times and tried to knee the plaintiff in the groin.31  
                                                          
 25. Id. at 390 (quoting 644 F. Supp. 246, 248 (W.D.N.C. 1986), vacated sub nom., Graham, 
490 U.S. 386). 
 26. Id. at 395–97. 
 27. Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Rubin, J., concurring in 
part), abrogated by Harper v. Harris Cnty., 21 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). 
 28. E.g., Washpon v. Parr, 561 F. Supp. 2d 394, 407 n.40 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Graham, 
490 U.S. at 396).  The Washpon court further found that a “‘[d]e minimis injury can serve as 
conclusive evidence that de minimis force was used.’”  Id. (quoting Carr v. Deeds, 453 F.3d 593, 606 
(4th Cir. 2006)). 
 29. Iafrate v. Globosits, Civ. A. No. 87-5612, 1989 WL 14062, at *4 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 
1989). 
 30. See id. at *1.  Although the court does not characterize it as such because the alleged 
excessive-force claim arose out of an arrest, the implication is that the plaintiff alleged excessive 
force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
 31. Id. at *2. 
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The plaintiff and the police officer ultimately scuffled on the ground, 
after which the plaintiff was placed into custody.32  The plaintiff suffered 
a cut to his hand, which was subsequently cleaned and bandaged.33 
The court began its discussion of the plaintiff’s excessive-force 
allegation by recognizing that “[t]he use of force to effect a lawful arrest 
is privileged.”34  To succeed, the plaintiff must demonstrate that “the 
officer lacked probable cause . . . or that the force used was excessive.”35  
In its analysis of the plaintiff’s excessive-force claim, the court focused 
on what it thought was the insignificant nature of the plaintiff’s injury.36  
It noted that “the only possible injury [the] plaintiff could have suffered 
before he began resisting was a cut to his finger, which . . . required no 
medical attention.”37  Indeed, although the plaintiff also alleged that the 
arresting officer’s use of force aggravated his preexisting back 
problems,38 the court did not find that the plaintiff “provided anything 
more than a scintilla of evidence to support a claim of excessive force.”39  
In characterizing the arresting officer’s alleged use of force as “self-
defense,” the court noted that the plaintiff would have suffered nothing 
more than de minimis injuries from blows that did not strike their 
intended target.40 
Following the Iafrate court’s use of “de minimis injury,” the phrase 
appeared again, a year later, in Judge Goldberg’s dissenting opinion in 
Wisniewski v. Kennard.41  Here, the plaintiff, a prisoner, escaped from 
jail and was later apprehended.42  The plaintiff alleged that the arresting 
officer violated the Fourth Amendment when he used excessive force 
while apprehending him.43  The plaintiff alleged that the arresting officer 
“handcuffed [the plaintiff], then placed his revolver in [the plaintiff’s] 
mouth, threatened to blow his head off, and twice punched him in the 
                                                          
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at *3 (citing Edwards v. City of Philadelphia, 860 F.2d 568, 570 (3d Cir. 1988); 
McKinney v. Whitfield, 736 F.2d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
 35. Id. at *3 (citing Edwards, 860 F.2d at 571, 572; Belcher v. United States, 511 F. Supp. 476, 
484 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652, 672–73 (E.D. Pa. 1978)). 
 36. Id. at *4. 
 37. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 38. Id. at *4 n.2. 
 39. Id. at *4. 
 40. Id. at *4 n.3. 
 41. 901 F.2d 1276, 1279 (5th Cir. 1990) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. at 1277 (per curiam). 
 43. Id. 
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stomach.”44  The plaintiff further alleged that the officer’s actions 
frightened him, caused him mental anguish, and caused him to suffer bad 
dreams.45  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
arresting officer, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision.46  The 
majority’s short opinion relied on its earlier decision in Johnson v. 
Morel.47  As understood by the Wisniewski court, Morel required that a 
plaintiff demonstrate “proof of a significant injury as a threshold for the 
recovery of money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where excessive 
force in an illegal arrest was claimed.”48  Although the Wisniewski court 
recognized that the Morel court had not addressed the question of 
whether a non-physical injury could constitute a significant injury, the 
court nevertheless determined that the “[plaintiff’s] injuries [we]re not 
significant within the meaning of Morel.”49 
In his dissent, Judge Goldberg disagreed with the majority’s opinion 
that the officer was entitled to summary judgment.50  Instead, Judge 
Goldberg believed that the plaintiff had suffered a significant injury 
pursuant to Morel.51  Judge Goldberg noted with approval, however, that 
the Morel court characterized injuries that do not meet the “‘significant’” 
standard as “minor harms and transient distress[es].”52  Indeed, Judge 
Goldberg recognized that pursuant to Morel, those sorts of insignificant 
“de minimis injuries” do not give rise to a constitutional claim of 
excessive force.53  Judge Goldberg’s use of “de minimis injury” is the 
first time the phrase enters the lexicon of Fourth Amendment excessive-
force jurisprudence at the circuit level. 
                                                          
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.; id. at 1278 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
 46. Id. at 1277 (per curiam). 
 47. Id. (citing Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (per curiam), 
abrogated by Harper v. Harris Cnty., 21 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)). 
 48. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Morel, 876 F.2d at 480). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1279 (quoting Morel, 876 F.2d at 480). 
 53. Id. 
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3. The Supreme Court’s Rejection of a Mandatory Quantum of Injury 
for Eighth Amendment Excessive-Force Claims 
In McMillian v. Hudson, the Supreme Court questioned the 
“significant injury” prong of excessive-force analysis54—upon which 
Judge Goldberg relied to implant an explicit de minimis exception into 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—and subsequent decisions recognized 
the invalidity of the requirement.55  In Hudson, an inmate filed an Eighth 
Amendment claim alleging that prison guards used excessive force after 
a verbal confrontation with the inmate.56  The inmate alleged that after 
the verbal exchange, one guard held him in place while kicking and 
punching him as another guard punched him in the mouth, eyes, chest, 
and stomach.57  As a result of the confrontation, the inmate suffered 
“minor bruises and swelling of his face, mouth, and lip,” loosened teeth, 
and a cracked dental plate.58  While the district court found that the 
prison guards used excessive force, the Fifth Circuit reversed.59 
The Fifth Circuit articulated a test for Eighth Amendment excessive-
force claims, which required that inmates must demonstrate, among other 
things, that the injury resulting from the force was “significant.”60  After 
characterizing the inmate’s injuries as “minor” and noting that he did not 
require medical attention, the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the prison 
guards.61  The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Fifth Circuit and 
held that there is no “significant injury” requirement for valid Eighth 
Amendment excessive-force claims.62 
The Court began by reexamining precedent regarding violations of 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
                                                          
 54. 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1991). 
 55. Knight v. Caldwell, 970 F.2d 1430, 1432 (5th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that Hudson 
overturned Fifth Circuit law requiring significant injury for excessive-force claims).  In recognizing 
the Supreme Court’s rejection of a “significant injury” requirement for Eighth Amendment 
excessive-force claims, the Fifth Circuit held that the “significant injury” standard no longer 
governed Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims.  Harper v. Harris Cnty., 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. 1). 
 56. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 4–5 (citing 929 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)). 
 60. Id. at 5 (citing 929 F.2d at 1015). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 4, 12. 
MCKECHNIE FINAL 11/21/2011  8:20 AM 
148 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
 
punishment during a prison riot.63  It reaffirmed that the inquiry under the 
Eighth Amendment rests on whether the “force was applied in a good-
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 
sadistically to cause harm.”64  The Court affirmed that in balancing the 
need for order and discipline against the risk of injury, “‘[p]rison 
administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the 
adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment 
are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain 
institutional security.’”65  Because the interests that existed in its 
previous Eighth Amendment analysis regarding cruel and unusual 
punishment were similar to Eighth Amendment excessive-force claims, 
the Court held that the same inquiry applied.66 
The Court rejected the notion that a claimant must suffer a requisite 
measure of injury to support an Eighth Amendment claim.67  It noted that 
when prison officials intentionally use force to cause harm, 
“contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . . whether or 
not significant injury is evident.”68  Indeed, some types of force that, 
theoretically, leave little or no injury would nonetheless be excessive 
under certain circumstances.  To that end, the Court reasoned that if the 
inquiry rested on some capricious measure of injury, “any physical 
punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman,” would be permissible 
so long as it inflicted less than the proscribed amount of harm on the 
victim.69  The Court, however, did not preclude an inquiry into the 
victim’s injury.70  Instead, the Court held that the extent of the injury is 
one factor among several that may suggest the use of force was 
excessive.71  The Court also discussed the relevance of the nature of 
force prison officials employ.72  It reaffirmed the maxim that not “every 
malevolent touch by a prison guard” will rise to the level of an Eighth 
                                                          
 63. Id. at 5–7. 
 64. Id. at 7. 
 65. Id. at 6 (alteration in original) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1986)). 
 66. Id. at 6–7. 
 67. Id. at 8–9. 
 68. Id. at 9 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. at 7 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321). 
 71. Id.  Other factors include the “need for application of force, the relationship between that 
need and the amount of force used, the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,’ and 
‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.’”  Id. (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 
321). 
 72. See id. at 8–10. 
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Amendment violation.73  As such, de minimis uses of force will not 
violate the Eighth Amendment so long as they are not “‘repugnant to the 
conscience of mankind.’”74 
4. Despite Graham and Hudson, a Review of the Magnitude of an 
Arrestee’s Injury Continues 
The phrase de minimis injury appeared within the context of 
excessive-force claims analyzed under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments at various times in the five years after Wisniewski and the 
three years after Hudson.75  The Fourth Circuit, however, next 
entertained the concept that de minimis injuries do not provide a basis for 
excessive-force claims under the Fourth Amendment.76  Initially, in 
Browning v. Snead, the district court faced an argument by a defendant 
police officer and a municipality that a plaintiff’s excessive-force claim 
should be dismissed because the plaintiff had presented evidence of no 
more than a de minimis injury.77  The court implied that evidence of de 
minimis injuries in a case alleging excessive force may not suffice to 
show a constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment.78  The 
court refused, however, to address the validity of the defendant’s de 
minimis injury argument.79  Instead, the court found that “[e]ven if the de 
minimis [injury] standard applies to Fourth Amendment claims,” the 
plaintiff’s allegation that he suffered a detached retina was serious 
enough to deny the defendants’ motion to dismiss.80 
A year later, and four years after Hudson, the Fourth Circuit 
recognized a de minimis injury exception to Fourth Amendment 
excessive-force claims.81  In Ritchie v. Jackson, a plaintiff alleged that a 
police officer used excessive force when “one officer grabbed [the 
plaintiff] by the shirt[,] lifted him off the ground[,] and [applied] 
                                                          
 73. Id. at 9 (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). 
 74. Id. at 9–10 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327). 
 75. See, e.g., Norman v. Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1263 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc), abrogated by 
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175 (2010). 
 76. Browning v. Snead, 886 F. Supp. 547, 552 (S.D. W. Va. 1995). 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Ritchie v. Jackson, No. 95-3057, 1996 WL 585152, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 11, 1996) (per 
curiam). 
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handcuffs too tightly.”82  The court held the plaintiff “allege[d] no more 
than [a] de minimis injury” and, as a result, the “claims of excessive 
force [were] without merit,”83 thereby linking the extent of the plaintiff’s 
injury with the validity of the claim.  In recognizing this relationship 
between allegations of de minimis injuries and their inability to constitute 
meritorious excessive-force claims, the Ritchie court cited the Eighth 
Circuit’s holding in Foster v. Metropolitan Airports Commission, a pre-
Hudson case.84  Foster demonstrates that the Eighth Circuit, in 
evaluating the validity of excessive-force claims, looked for allegations 
of “long-term injury”85 and “permanent injury”86—precisely the sort of 
inquiry the Supreme Court forbade in Hudson.87  The severity of injury 
that the Eighth Circuit required in Foster—and upon which the Fourth 
Circuit based the de minimis injury exception—was therefore similar in 
scope to the extent of the injury that the Fifth Circuit required in Morel88 
and that Hudson had rejected.89  Ritchie’s citation to Foster and its focus 
on an arbitrary quantity of injury, however, solidified a de minimis injury 
exception to excessive-force claims in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Since the Supreme Court rejected the “significant injury” 
requirement under the Eighth Amendment, courts have widely 
recognized that a Fourth Amendment excessive-force victim need not 
demonstrate a “significant” injury.90  While the Graham Court, however, 
made no mention of the need for an injury in a Fourth Amendment 
excessive-force claim, some circuits still require an arbitrary amount of 
injury.  By requiring an injury, those circuits have perpetuated the de 
                                                          
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. (citing Foster v. Metro. Airports Comm’n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1082 (8th Cir. 1990)). 
 84. Id. (citing Foster, 914 F.2d at 1082). 
 85. Foster, 914 F.2d at 1082 (citing Hannula v. City of Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129, 132 n.3 (10th 
Cir. 1990)). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 88. Compare Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(requiring “significant injury”), abrogated by Harper v. Harris Cnty., 21 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(per curiam), with Foster, 914 F.2d at 1082 (noting the absence of both “long-term injury” and 
“permanent injury”). 
 89. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 90. E.g., Bastien v. Goddard, 279 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 2002) (“‘[A] trialworthy “excessive 
force” claim is not precluded merely because only minor injuries were inflicted by the seizure.’  That 
view is widely held.”  (alteration in original) (citations and footnote omitted) (quoting Alexis v. 
McDonald’s Rests. of Mass., Inc., 67 F.3d 341, 353 (1st Cir. 1995))); Harper, 21 F.3d at 600 (per 
curiam) (holding that the “significant injury” standard was no longer valid in Fourth Amendment 
excessive-force claims) (citing Knight v. Caldwell, 970 F.2d 1430, 1432 (5th Cir. 1992)). 
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minimis injury exception, thus precluding what might otherwise be valid 
claims.  Left to their own devices by the Supreme Court’s silence on the 
issue, courts have developed a hodgepodge of tests and considerations to 
cope with this unconstitutional requirement. 
C. The De Minimis Injury Exception Now 
Whether an arrestee must establish an injury in a Fourth Amendment 
excessive-force claim has been answered differently in almost every 
circuit.  Courts, however, generally fall into one of three categories 
regarding an injury requirement and the recognition of the de minimis 
injury exception.  First, there are those circuits that require an arrestee to 
establish an injury and, if the injury is de minimis, the arrestee fails to 
state a cause of action.91  Next, there are those circuits in which the 
circuit court generally follows the Graham analysis, but the circuit itself 
or district courts nevertheless recognize an injury requirement or injury-
based consideration.92  Finally, some circuits strictly follow the Graham 
analysis and neither require an injury nor recognize a de minimis injury 
exception.93 
The Supreme Court has added another layer to the analysis.  While 
not addressing the Fourth Amendment, the Court recently revisited 
Hudson.  It directly addressed the de minimis injury exception within the 
context of the Eighth Amendment and found it wanting.94 
1. Circuit Courts that Require an Injury and Have Recognized the De 
Minimis Injury Exception 
a. The Fifth Circuit 
Of the circuits that require an injury to succeed in a Fourth 
Amendment excessive-force claim, the Fifth Circuit’s test garners the 
most use and attention.  After the Supreme Court’s decision in Graham, 
but before the Court’s decision in Hudson, the Fifth Circuit articulated a 
three-prong test for an excessive-force claim under the Fourth 
                                                          
 91. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 92. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 93. See infra Part II.C.3. 
 94. See infra Part II.C.4. 
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Amendment.  In Morel, the Fifth Circuit stated that an arrestee must 
establish “(1) a significant injury, which (2) resulted directly and only 
from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the need; and the 
excessiveness of which was (3) objectively unreasonable.”95  While the 
Fifth Circuit submitted that it was guided by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Graham,96 the Graham analysis did not require an injury and 
rejected the opportunity to adopt such a requirement.97  Indeed, the Morel 
court failed to cite any authority from Graham to support the 
requirement.98  Nevertheless, the “significant injury” requirement lived 
on in Fifth Circuit jurisprudence for approximately three years until 
Hudson.99  After the Supreme Court rejected a significant-injury 
requirement for Eighth Amendment claims in Hudson, the Fifth Circuit 
amended its Fourth Amendment three-prong test.100  It did not jettison 
the focus on an injury and refocus on the force used, which would have 
thus brought it more in line with the original Graham decision.  Instead, 
it simply dropped the word “significant” from the test to reduce the 
quantum of injury required while still requiring “some form of injury.”101  
As evidence of the Fifth Circuit’s reluctance to change its analysis, save 
the removal of the word “significant,” the test remained the same. 
While the Fifth Circuit’s “more than de minimis injury” requirement 
is untenable within the context of Supreme Court Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, it is no more tenable as applied in practice.  In trying to 
articulate an understandable and workable analysis of what constitutes 
more than a de minimis injury, the court engaged in a convoluted 
analysis.  Graham compels courts to decide Fourth Amendment 
excessive-force claims based on whether the force was objectively 
reasonable under the circumstances.102  In attempting to describe how its 
injury requirement factors into an excessive-force claim, the Fifth Circuit 
                                                          
 95. Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (per curiam), abrogated by 
Harper v. Harris Cnty., 21 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (footnote omitted). 
 96. Id. at 478. 
 97. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
 98. Morel, 876 F.2d at 480; id. at 481 (Rubin, J., concurring in part) (criticizing the majority for 
adding significant-injury and causation requirements to the analysis in Graham). 
 99. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992) (rejecting significant injury requirements). 
 100. Knight v. Caldwell, 970 F.2d 1430, 1432 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 101. Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703–04 (quoting Jackson v. Culbertson, 984 F.2d 699, 
700 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)), decision clarified on reh’g by 186 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1999) (per 
curiam). 
 102. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). 
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instructs that “‘[t]he amount of injury necessary to satisfy our 
requirement of “some injury” and establish a constitutional violation is 
directly related to the amount of force that is constitutionally permissible 
under the circumstances.’”103  To know what is constitutionally 
permissible in any particular circumstance, however, the analysis comes 
full circle and must examine, pursuant to Graham, whether the force was 
objectively reasonable under the circumstances.  Therefore, the Court’s 
analytical structure to determine what constitutes a de minimis injury is a 
useless exercise that brings one back to the original Graham inquiry.  
Further, despite the Supreme Court’s admonishment in Hudson that 
requiring arbitrary amounts of injury conflicts with excessive-force 
jurisprudence, the Fifth Circuit recognized that whether an injury is de 
minimis is “subjective—it is defined entirely by the context in which the 
injury arises.”104 
In addition to this convoluted analysis, the Fifth Circuit has virtually 
relented on the injury requirement without truly letting go.  In Flores v. 
City of Palacios, a plaintiff alleged purely psychological injuries within 
the context of a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim.105  The Fifth 
Circuit recognized that under certain circumstances where a plaintiff 
lacks a physical injury, psychological injuries could nonetheless fulfill 
the “injury” requirement.106  Although the court recognized that a 
plaintiff need not allege a physical injury, it reintroduced a significant-
injury requirement under a new name—the “substantial injury” 
requirement within the context of psychological injuries.107  
Consequently, where plaintiffs have no physical injury as a result of 
excessive force used against them—as is regularly the case with 
nonlethal weapons108—they must demonstrate not only some arbitrary 
quantum of psychological injury, but, seemingly in conflict with the 
Hudson Court’s intent, it must also be “substantial.”109 
                                                          
 103. Williams, 180 F.3d at 703–04 (quoting Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
 104. Id. at 704. 
 105. 381 F.3d 391, 397 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 106. Id. at 400–01. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See infra Part III.D. 
 109. Flores, 381 F.3d at 400–01. 
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b. The Tenth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit is not alone in its “more than a de minimis injury” 
requirement for a plaintiff to succeed on a Fourth Amendment excessive-
force claim.  Nor is it alone in the puzzling and, at times, difficult-to-
reconcile consequences of recognizing a de minimis injury exception to 
Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims.  For example, while the 
Tenth Circuit has “decline[d] to adopt a ‘bright-line’ standard dictating 
that force cannot be ‘excessive’ unless it leaves visible cuts, bruises, 
abrasions[,] or scars,”110 it has recognized that a plaintiff must 
demonstrate “some actual injury caused by the unreasonable seizure that 
is not de minimis, be it physical or emotional.”111  These two statements 
seem to be mutually exclusive and, indeed, were difficult enough for a 
district court judge to reconcile that the Tenth Circuit was forced to 
reaffirm—without abandoning its de minimis injury exception—“that an 
excessive force claim is not dependent on physical injury or even 
physical contact, but on ‘patently unreasonable conduct’ by the arresting 
officer.”112  Presumably the Tenth Circuit, therefore, has left its district 
courts wondering why they should investigate the magnitude of the 
injury if an excessive-force claim does not turn on the scale of the injury. 
c. The Eighth Circuit 
The Eighth Circuit’s handling of the de minimis injury exception in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is similarly difficult to reconcile.  In 
2005, the Eighth Circuit stated in unequivocal terms that “[a]n ‘actual 
injury’ must be shown to support an excessive force claim under the 
Fourth Amendment.”113  As recently as 2009, however, the court 
reaffirmed a hedging of the relevancy of an injury’s severity in Fourth 
Amendment excessive-force claims.  In Cook v. City of Bella Villa, the 
Eighth Circuit in one breath reaffirmed a previous noncommittal 
determination that “‘[i]t remains an open question in [the Eighth Circuit] 
                                                          
 110. Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 111. Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1129 n.25 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citing Tarver v. 
City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 752 (5th Cir. 2005)). 
 112. Grass v. Johnson, 322 F. App’x. 586, 590 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Cortez, 478 F.3d at 
1131). 
 113. Hanig v. Lee, 415 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Dawkins v. Graham, 50 F.3d 532, 
535 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
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whether an excessive force claim requires some minimum level of 
injury,’”114 while at the same time stating that the “lack, or minor degree, 
of any injury sustained during an arrest is relevant in considering the 
reasonableness of the force used.”115  In support of the latter, the court 
cited to cases that recognized “a de minimis amount of force, without any 
resulting injury, [is] insufficient to support a finding of a constitutional 
violation.”116  Put another way, while the court stated that it had not 
determined whether a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim requires 
some arbitrary, minimum level of injury, it nonetheless contradictorily 
cited with approval the premise that some level of more than de minimis 
injury is required.  Indeed, although the Eighth Circuit attempts to 
distance itself from the implications associated with fully embracing the 
requirement that an arrestee demonstrate some quantum of injury, its 
jurisprudence is replete with decisions that affirm the theory that “de 
minimis injuries . . . preclude a claim for excessive force.”117 
In addition, the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly reaffirmed the post-
Graham, pre-Hudson need for a permanent injury to survive a Fourth 
Amendment excessive-force claim in some situations.  In 1990, the 
Eighth Circuit, in evaluating the validity of an excessive-force claim 
where handcuffs were applied too tightly, required allegations of “long-
term injury”118 and “permanent injury.”119  In Crumley, eleven years after 
Hudson, the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its pre-Hudson requirement that 
where a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim arises out of the 
manner in which handcuffs are applied, an arrestee must allege “long-
term or permanent physical injury.”120  In so holding, the Eighth Circuit 
reaffirmed its raising of the evidentiary bar for certain Fourth 
Amendment excessive-force claims.  It did so by not only requiring more 
than de minimis injury or more than a minor injury, but, indeed, 
                                                          
 114. 582 F.3d 840, 850 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hunter v. Namanny, 219 F.3d 825, 831 (8th Cir. 
2000)). 
 115. Id. at 851 (citing Greiner v. City of Champlin, 27 F.3d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
 116. Id. (citing Crumley v. City of St. Paul, 324 F.3d 1003, 1007 (8th Cir. 2003); Foster v. 
Metro. Airports Comm’n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1082 (8th Cir. 1990)). 
 117. E.g., Andrews v. Fuoss, 417 F.3d 813, 818 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Crumley, 324 F.3d at 
1007). 
 118. Foster, 914 F.2d at 1082 (citing Hannula v. City of Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129, 132 n.3 (10th 
Cir. 1990)); supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
 119. Foster, 914 F.2d at 1082; supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
 120. Crumley, 324 F.3d at 1008. 
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something rising to the level of a severe or permanent injury.121  While 
Foster and Crumley dealt specifically with allegations that handcuffs 
were applied too tightly, the “permanent injury” analysis has bled into 
cases that did not consider the tightness of handcuffs, but instead the 
manner in which the arrestee was placed in handcuffs.  For example, the 
Eighth Circuit has used a “less-than-permanent” injury to support a 
conclusion that the alleged scrapes, bruises, and aggravation of a prior 
shoulder injury incurred during the subduing and positioning of an 
arrestee in order to apply handcuffs did not support the conclusion that 
the police officer used excessive force.122 
d. The Fourth Circuit 
Although the Fourth Circuit has not fully developed a position 
regarding a de minimis injury exception, it has at least created 
uncertainty regarding its acknowledgment of a de minimis injury 
exception within the context of the Fourth Amendment and, at most, has 
recognized the exception.  The concept of a de minimis injury exception 
entered the Fourth Circuit’s jurisprudence by way of the Ritchie decision, 
in which the court held that a plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment excessive-
force claim is meritless when he alleges “no more than [a] de minimis 
injury.”123  Since the Ritchie case, district courts in the Fourth Circuit 
have continued to use the exception and have relied on Ritchie124 or now-
overruled Eighth Amendment cases recognizing the de minimis injury 
exception.125 
                                                          
 121. Id. 
 122. Wertish v. Krueger, 433 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 123. Ritchie v. Jackson, No. 95-3057, 1996 WL 585152, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 11, 1996) (per 
curiam) (citing Foster, 914 F.2d at 1082); see supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
 124. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Reece, No. 3:07-885-HFF-JRM, 2008 WL 2852164, at *5 (D.S.C. July 
22, 2008), abrogated by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175 (2010) (per curiam); Batts v. Lyle, No. 
3:06-1875-TLW-JRM, 2007 WL 2220402, at *4 (D.S.C. July 27, 2007), abrogated by Wilkins, 130 
S. Ct. 1175; Vanover v. Blendowski, No. 3:05-2956-DCN-JRM, 2006 WL 3513682, at *5 (D.S.C. 
Dec. 5, 2006), abrogated by Wilkins, 130 S. Ct. 1175; Wilkerson v. Hester, 114 F. Supp. 2d 446, 463 
(W.D.N.C. 2000), abrogated by Wilkins, 130 S. Ct. 1175.  The Ritchie case is spelled as “Richie” in 
some of the preceding cases. 
 125. See, e.g., Grier v. Cappo, No. 4:05-0426-TLW-TER, 2007 WL 858868, at *6 (D.S.C. Mar. 
19, 2007) (citing Norman v. Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1262 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc), abrogated by 
Wilkins, 130 S. Ct. 1175 (per curiam)); Mickle v. Ahmed, 444 F. Supp. 2d 601, 619 (D.S.C. 2006) 
(discussing Norman, 25 F.3d 1259); Allmond v. Alexandria Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. Civ.A. 02-309-A, 
2002 WL 32514956, at *3 (E.D. Va. June 4, 2002) (citing Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1164 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (en banc), abrogated by Wilkins, 130 S. Ct. 1175)); Martin v. Mendoza, 230 F. Supp. 2d 
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The district courts’ reliance on Ritchie and the now-defunct Eighth 
Amendment analysis is understandable based on the murky signals 
coming from the Fourth Circuit.  For example, seven years after the 
Ritchie court recognized a de minimis injury exception, the Fourth 
Circuit had the opportunity to tangentially discuss the de minimis injury 
concept within the context of the Fourth Amendment in Jones v. 
Buchanan.126  In Jones, an arrestee brought an excessive-force claim 
against a police officer who allegedly knocked him to the floor, “jumped 
on him, crush[ed his] nose, lacerat[ed] his lips and nose, and bruis[ed] 
his ribs.”127  In analyzing the arrestee’s allegation, ostensibly within the 
framework the Supreme Court provided in Graham, the Fourth Circuit 
methodically discussed four factors to consider when determining 
whether a plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to rise to the level of a 
Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim.128  The first three factors, (1) 
the “‘severity of the crime at issue,’” (2) “whether the ‘suspect poses an 
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,’” and (3) 
“whether the suspect ‘is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 
arrest by flight,’” were followed by a citation to, and were direct 
quotations from, the Graham decision.129  The fourth factor, “the severity 
of [plaintiff’s] injury,” however, lacks a citation to Graham130 and was 
instead arguably supported by Supreme Court dicta131 and citations to 
Fourth Circuit cases,132 some of which validated the inquiry into the 
                                                                                                                       
665, 671–72 (D. Md. 2002) (citing Norman, 25 F.3d at 1263); White v. Md. Transp. Auth., 151 F. 
Supp. 2d 651, 657 (D. Md. 2001) (citing Riley, 115 F.3d at 1166–68).  See also Lassiter, 2008 WL 
2852164 at *5; Batts, 2007 WL 2220402 at *4; Vanover, 2006 WL 3513682 at *5; Wilkerson, 114 F. 
Supp. 2d at 463.  Each of these last four Eighth Amendment cases was overruled by Wilkins, 130 S. 
Ct. 1175 (2010), discussed in Part II.C.4. 
 126. 325 F.3d 520, 530–31 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 127. Id. at 522–23. 
 128. Id. at 527–31. 
 129. Id. at 527 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). 
 130. Id. at 527–28. 
 131. Id. at 531 (“Our conclusion is confirmed by the uncontested fact that the force was not so 
excessive that respondent suffered hurt or injury.” (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 209 
(2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009))).  But see 
Morrison v. Bd. of Trs., 583 F.3d 394, 403 (6th Cir. 2009) (construing the Court’s comments in 
Saucier about the magnitude of injury an arrestee sustained as a “passing reference as a mere 
expression of the Court’s skepticism about the adequacy of [the alleged] injuries, without adopting a 
definitive stance on the issue”). 
 132. Jones, 325 F.3d at 527 (citing Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 174 (4th Cir. 1994); Pressly 
v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987)); id. at 530 (citing Kane v. Hargis, 987 F.2d 1005, 
1008 (4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)); id. at 531 (citing Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 369 (4th Cir. 
2002); Mensh v. Dyer, 956 F.2d 36, 40 (4th Cir. 1991)). 
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amount of injury but lacked the citations within the cases themselves to 
support such an inquiry.133  Then, in addressing the dissent’s argument, 
the court addressed the de minimis injury exception to excessive-force 
claims and seemed to allude to its inapplicability to Fourth Amendment 
claims.134  In juxtaposing the requirements of a Fourteenth Amendment 
excessive-force claim with the requirements of a Fourth Amendment 
excessive-force claim, the court stated that under the Fourth Amendment, 
a plaintiff need “simply prov[e] that the police acted unreasonably in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment,” while under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a plaintiff has “to prove that . . . [police] misconduct 
amounted to punishment and resulted in more than de minimis injury to 
him.”135  Seemingly, the court, therefore, did not consider a de minimis 
injury analysis as part of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the circuit. 
Confusingly, however, two years later in Sellers v. Waring—an 
opinion with no analysis and no oral argument—the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal of a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim on 
the basis that the plaintiff “fail[ed] to allege that he suffered more than de 
minimis injury.”136  As a result, while it seemed at most doomed and at 
least relegated to a factor for consideration by the Jones decision, the de 
minimis injury exception to Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims 
appears to remain valid in the Fourth Circuit.  Indeed, no less than 
thirteen district court cases have recognized the exception since 
Sellers.137 
                                                          
 133. See Brown, 278 F.3d at 369 (stating plaintiff “alleg[ed] no injury of any magnitude” but 
cited no authority to support this consideration under the Fourth Amendment); Mensh, 956 F.2d at 
40 (stating “[i]t is undisputed that [plaintiff] suffered no physical injury as a result of the incident” 
but citing no authority to support this consideration under the Fourth Amendment). 
 134. Jones, 325 F.3d at 535 n.8. 
 135. Id. (citing Robles v. Prince George’s Cnty., 302 F.3d 262, 269 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
 136. 141 F. App’x. 121, 122 n.* (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 
215, 219 n.3 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
 137. See Masterson v. Grant, No. 1:10CV445(LMB/JFA), 2011 WL 250562, at *6 (E.D. Va. Jan. 
25, 2011) (holding “de minimis injuries cannot support a claim for excessive use of force” (citing 
Felton v. Chupik, No. 00-CV-1889, 2002 WL 32344335, at *4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 21, 2002))); Dunbar 
v. New Ellenton Police Dep’t, No. 9:08-2436-HFF-BM, 2010 WL 1073152, at *6 (D.S.C. Feb. 24, 
2010) (rejecting as de minimis an injury that “was not overtly serious . . . [and] was only of a 
superficial nature” (citing Norman v. Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1263 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc), 
abrogated by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175 (2010) (per curiam))), adopted sub nom., Dunbar v. 
Allentown Police Dep’t, 2010 WL 1007475 (D.S.C. Mar. 18, 2010); Stevens v. Spartanburg Cnty. 
Prob., Parole, & Pardon Servs., No. 6:09-795-HMH-WMC, 2010 WL 678953, at *9 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 
2010) (“[I]n the course of a lawful arrest, ‘the application of de minimis force, without more, will not 
support a claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.’”  (quoting Nolin v. 
Isbelt, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000))); Fluker v. Owens, No. 9:08-3704-HFF-BM, 2009 WL 
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2. Circuits that Generally Follow the Graham Analysis but 
Nevertheless Recognize an Injury Requirement or Injury-Based 
Consideration 
a. The Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit does not require an arrestee to demonstrate that 
he or she suffered an injury and has not adopted a de minimis injury 
exception to Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims.138  Instead, the 
Second Circuit has focused its “de minimis inquiry” on the amount of 
force the police officer uses,139 not the amount of injury the arrestee 
sustains.  Indeed, in an unpublished opinion, the Second Circuit 
recognized that it has “permitted claims to survive summary judgment 
                                                                                                                       
3048719, at *6 (D.S.C. Sept. 23, 2009) (citing Thaddeus-X v. Wozniak, No. 99-1720, 2000 WL 
712383, at *3 (6th Cir. May 23, 2000); Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999)), aff’d, 
361 F. App’x 510 (4th Cir. 2010); Corbin v. Woolums, No. 3:08cv173, 2008 WL 5049912, at *7 
(E.D. Va. Nov. 25, 2008) (“[Plaintiff] suffered only temporary swelling and bruising—hardly a 
significant injury.”); Trull v. Smolka, No. 3:08CV460-HEH, 2008 WL 4279599, at *5 (E.D. Va. 
Sept. 18, 2008) (“Plaintiff has failed to allege more than a de minimis injury as required by the 
Fourth Amendment.”  (citing Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 219 n.3 (4th Cir. 1999))); Munyiri v. 
Haduch, 585 F. Supp. 2d 670, 677 (D. Md. 2008) (“Claims of a de minimis injury . . . are 
insufficient.”  (citing Norman, 25 F.3d at 1263; Carter, 164 F.3d at 219)); Lassiter v. Reece, No. 
3:07-885-HFF-JRM, 2008 WL 2852164, at *4 (D.S.C. July 22, 2008) (“Plaintiff fails to show more 
than de minimis injury.”  (citing Ritchie v. Jackson, No. 95-3057, 1996 WL 585152, at *2 (4th Cir. 
1996))), abrogated by Wilkins, 130 S. Ct. 1175; Batts v. Lyle, No. 3:06-1875-TLW-JRM, 2007 WL 
2220402, at *4 (D.S.C. July 27, 2007) (“Plaintiff fails to show more than de minimis injury.”  (citing 
Ritchie, 1996 WL 585152, at *2; Joos v. Ratliff, 97 F.3d 1125, 1126 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam))) 
abrogated by Wilkins, 130 S. Ct. 1175; Grier v. Cappo, No. 4:05-0426-TLW-TER, 2007 WL 
858868, at *6 (D.S.C. Mar. 19, 2007) (“Even assuming, arguendo, there was excessive force used 
during the arrest, a plaintiff may not recover, however, for only de minimis injuries.”  (citing 
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4)), abrogated by Wilkins, 130 S. Ct. 1175; Vanover v. Blendowski, No. 3:05-
2956-DCN-JRM, 2006 WL 3513682, at *5 (D.S.C. Dec. 5, 2006) (“Plaintiff fails to show more than 
de minimis injury.”  (citing Ritchie, 1996 WL 585152, at *2; Joos, 97 F.3d at 1126 (per curiam))), 
abrogated by Wilkins, 130 S. Ct. 1175; Wilson v. Police Dep’t, No. Civ.A. 7:06-CV-00476, 2006 
WL 2944940, at *1 (W.D. Va. Oct. 13, 2006) (“To state a claim that the use of handcuffs during 
arrest was unreasonable, plaintiff must allege facts indicating that he suffered more than de minimis 
injury.”); Mickle v. Ahmed, 444 F. Supp. 2d 601, 619 (D.S.C. 2006) (“A plaintiff may not recover, 
however, for only de minimis injuries.”  (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992))).  But 
see Ames v. Harford Cnty., No. RDB 09-1929, 2010 WL 1791547, at *7 (D. Md. May 4, 2010) 
(holding that Wilkins abrogated the de minimis injury exception). 
 138. See United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1999) (adopting a de minimis standard 
only in Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claims).  The Second Circuit has held 
that an injury need not be permanent or severe to survive summary judgment.  See Hayes v. N.Y.C. 
Police Dep’t, No. 06-0595-pr, 2007 WL 130332, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 16, 2007) (citing Maxwell v. 
City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
 139. See Romano v. Howarth, 998 F.2d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[A] de minimis use of force 
will rarely suffice to state a constitutional claim.”  (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5–7)). 
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where the only injury alleged is bruising.”140  In yet another case, while 
the district court believed a plaintiff’s injuries were insufficiently serious 
to rise to the level of a viable excessive-force claim, the Second Circuit 
held that summary judgment was inappropriate where the plaintiff 
alleged pain in her arm, lower back, and head as a result of the force used 
to effectuate an arrest.141  The Second Circuit exclusively relies on and 
articulates the Graham analysis of objective reasonableness along with 
its accompanying factors as the appropriate framework within which to 
analyze a claim.142  While the Second Circuit has not adopted a de 
minimis injury exception, it has not specifically rejected the theory. 
In the gap left by the Second Circuit’s failure to address the viability 
of a de minimis injury exception, district courts have turned to other 
circuits or inward to their sister courts.  For example, in Li v. Aponte, the 
defendant argued that a plaintiff’s injuries were de minimis as a matter of 
law and therefore not cognizable.143  Although the court ruled against the 
defendant, it nonetheless held, citing Fourth Circuit case law, that a “‘de 
minimis injury can serve as conclusive evidence that de minimis force 
was used.’”144  In other cases, the district courts have cited sister courts 
to support a de minimis injury exception.  In Williams v. City of New 
York, for example, where a plaintiff alleged that, among other things, a 
police officer’s use of aerosol mace constituted excessive force, the court 
found that the plaintiff’s claims were not actionable because he had “not 
alleged any injuries from being sprayed with mace.”145  In addition, the 
court found that the plaintiff’s scrapes and bruises were no more than de 
minimis injuries and thus were not actionable.146  In support of both 
holdings regarding the lack of a Fourth Amendment claim due to the de 
minimis nature of the plaintiff’s injury, the district court simply cited to 
other district courts within the circuit.147 
                                                          
 140. Hayes, 2007 WL 130332 at *1 (citing Maxwell, 380 F.3d at 108). 
 141. Maxwell, 380 F.3d at 109–10. 
 142. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Falcone, No. 04-4849-CV, 2007 WL 247728, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 25, 
2007); Jones v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 61 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 143. No. 05 Civ. 6237(NRB), 2008 WL 4308127, at *6 n.41 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2008). 
 144. Id. at *6 (quoting Carr v. Deeds, 453 F.3d 593, 606 (4th Cir. 2006)). 
 145. No. 05 Civ. 10230(SAS), 2007 WL 2214390, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2007) (citing 
Murphy v. Neuburger, No. 94 Civ. 7421(AGS), 1996 WL 442797, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1996)). 
 146. Id. (citing Rincon v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 8276(LAP), 2005 WL 646080, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2005); Cunningham v. Rodriguez, No. 01 Civ. 1123(DC), 2002 WL 31654960, 
at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2002); Bove v. New York City, No. 98 Civ. 8800(HB), 1999 WL 
595620, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1999)). 
 147. See cases cited supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text. 
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b. The Third Circuit 
While the Third Circuit has not directly addressed the de minimis 
injury exception by name, it has rejected the idea that “the absence of 
physical injury necessarily signifies that the force has not been 
excessive.”148  Indeed, the Third Circuit routinely applies the Graham 
analysis for Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims and has only 
once referred to the term “de minimis injury” within that context.149  In 
an attempt to support its holding that an excessively tight handcuff claim 
can give rise to a viable Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, the 
court in Kopec v. Tate sought to distinguish the facts before it from 
Glenn v. City of Tyler.  The court noted that while the plaintiff in Kopec 
alleged an actual injury—permanent nerve damage to the wrist—the 
plaintiff in Glenn “failed to show more than a de minimis injury.”150  This 
arguably favorable, yet fleeting, reference is the only time the court has 
used the term “de minimis injury” within the context of Fourth 
Amendment excessive-force claims. 
Although the court has conceptually rejected the de minimis injury 
exception, in Gulley v. Elizabeth City Police Department, it nevertheless 
noted that the magnitude of an arrestee’s injury “is . . . one of the 
circumstances to be considered under the objective reasonableness 
standard set forth in Graham.”151  As a result, it appears the Third Circuit 
does not authorize an examination of an arrestee’s injuries as a separate 
step in addition to the Graham analysis for excessive-force claims.  
Instead, the magnitude of the arrestee’s injury is merely one of many 
factors to consider in the larger context of the analysis.152  It is unclear, 
however, when an arrestee’s “absence of physical injury”153 is 
considered.  The court did not indicate whether a district court may 
consider such an absence when it rules on dispositive motions or whether  
 
                                                          
 148. Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 
1395, 1400–01 (7th Cir. 1985), abrogated by Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 
1987)), abrogated on other grounds by Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 149. Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 778 n.7 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 
307, 314 (5th Cir. 2001)). 
 150. Id. (citing Glenn, 242 F.3d at 314). 
 151. No. 07-1124, 2009 WL 2219266, at *2 n.2 (3d Cir. July 27, 2009) (affirming the district 
court’s decision that rejected a de minimis injury exception argument by the defendant). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
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the consideration falls to the fact-finder when assessing liability, 
credibility, or damages.154 
c. The Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit has implicitly rejected a de minimis injury 
exception for most Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims, though 
some of its district courts have failed to follow its lead.  In Ingram v. City 
of Columbus, the district court found “as a matter of law that the officers 
did not apply excessive force . . . on the grounds that [the arrestees’] 
injuries were not sufficiently severe.”155  The Sixth Circuit, however, 
reversed the district court’s decision.156 
The court reasoned that its precedent permitted a plaintiff to allege 
the use of excessive force “even where the physical contact between the 
parties did not leave excessive marks or cause extensive physical 
damage.”157  Indeed, the court noted that there was no support in Sixth 
Circuit precedent for finding, as a matter of law, that police officers did 
not use excessive force simply because the plaintiff did not “suffer 
sufficient injuries.”158  The court went on to reject, as unsupported by the 
law, the district court’s assertion that the “‘nature and quality of the 
intrusion’ must include consideration of the severity of any injury 
inflicted.”159  Indeed, the Sixth Circuit three years earlier had cited with 
approval an excerpt from a Seventh Circuit decision that stated “a state is 
not free to inflict . . . pains without cause just so long as it is careful to 
leave no marks.”160  While it seems clear the Sixth Circuit has rejected a 
de minimis injury exception, some of the district courts within the circuit 
have failed to heed the ruling. 
                                                          
 154. Although it arose within the Eighth Amendment context, the Third Circuit rejected the 
theory that where a prisoner’s injury is de minimis, he does not have a viable constitutional claim.  
Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 648 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9–
10 (1992)).  The court, however, did not entirely dismiss the relevance of the amount of injury a 
plaintiff sustained in an excessive-force claim.  Id. at 649.  Indeed, the Smith court recognized that a 
fact-finder might properly consider the amount of injury a plaintiff suffered when, for example, 
assessing the credibility of the plaintiff’s version of events.  Id. 
 155. 185 F.3d 579, 597 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 156. Id. at 597–98. 
 157. Id. (citing Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
 158. Id. at 597. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Holmes, 78 F.3d at 1048 (quoting Williams v. Boles, 841 F.2d 181, 183 (7th Cir. 1988)) 
(internal quotations marks omitted). 
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For example, in Smith v. City of Chattanooga, when analyzing a 
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, the district court 
dutifully began its analysis with the analytical framework the Supreme 
Court outlined in Graham.161  After finishing the Graham inventory, 
however, the court, without citation to authority, pronounced that 
“[b]efore [the plaintiff could] make out a viable excessive force claim 
under . . . the Fourth Amendment . . . , he [was] required to prove that 
[the police officer] used excessive force and proximately caused [the 
plaintiff] to suffer a significant injury.  The injury must be more than de 
minimis.”162  The court went on to find that the plaintiff had not met that 
burden.163  Similarly, in Lee v. Ritter, the court analyzed an arrestee’s 
Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim.164  After listing the plaintiff’s 
injuries of “multiple contusions, abrasions[,] and hematomas,” the court 
stated in a footnote, but without a citation, that “[t]o prevail on an 
excessive force claim courts have found that the actual injury must be 
more than de minimis.”165 
While the district courts’ decisions discussed above may certainly be 
outliers, the Sixth Circuit has, like other circuits, carved out and created a 
special test for Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims related to 
“unduly tight or excessively forceful handcuffing during the course of a 
seizure.”166  To state a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim related 
to handcuffing in the Sixth Circuit, a plaintiff must establish that: “(1) he 
or she complained the handcuffs were too tight; (2) the officer ignored 
those complaints; and (3) the plaintiff experienced ‘some physical injury’ 
resulting from the handcuffing.”167  It has yet to be seen whether the 
requirement for “some physical injury” will bleed into the analysis of the 
handcuffing of an arrestee, as in the Eighth Circuit. 
                                                          
 161. No. 1:08-cv-63, 2009 WL 3762961, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2009). 
 162. Id. (emphasis added). 
 163. Id. at *8–9. 
 164. No. 1:02-CV-282, 2005 WL 3369616, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 12, 2005). 
 165. Id. at *22 n.3. 
 166. Morrison v. Bd. of Trs., 583 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Kostrzewa v. City of 
Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 639 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
 167. Id. at 401 (citing Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2005)). 
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d. The Eleventh Circuit 
Like the Sixth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit has rejected the 
opportunity to fully embrace and apply a strict de minimis injury 
exception to Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims.  In Lee v. 
Ferraro, the plaintiff alleged that a police officer slammed her head 
against the trunk of a car after she was handcuffed and subdued.168  In 
rejecting the district court’s decision that the lack of injury rendered the 
force de minimis, the court reasoned that “objectively unreasonable force 
does not become reasonable simply because the fortuity of the 
circumstances protected the plaintiff from suffering more severe physical 
harm.”169  In the same case, however, the court recognized a hybrid 
force–injury analysis, which would render meritless those cases where 
the force used and the injury sustained are both de minimis.170  This “de 
minimis force” exception arises out of Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale,171 
a post-Graham case.  When describing Post and its progeny, the court 
stated that the fact-intensive Graham inquiry may reject a Fourth 
Amendment excessive-force claim “when the facts show a minimal 
amount of force combined with a minor or nonexistent injury.”172  The 
court left out of the pronouncement an inquiry into the injury the arrestee 
sustained.173  In its summation of the case law that supported the 
pronouncement, however, the court noted that part of its de minimis force 
exception included a review of “the injury inflicted”174 or the “nature of 
[the] injury.”175 
In Draper v. Reynolds, the Eleventh Circuit clarified how the level of 
an arrestee’s injury affects an analysis of whether a police officer’s use 
of force under the Fourth Amendment was reasonable.176  Relying on a 
                                                          
 168. 284 F.3d 1188, 1191 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 169. Id. at 1200. 
 170. See id. (emphasizing that, while the plaintiff’s injury was minimal, she could still recover 
on the basis of the excessive force used). 
 171. 7 F.3d 1552, 1560 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 172. Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 173. See id. at 1257 (rendering the judgment based on the requirement that force be considered 
without considering the injury of the plaintiff). 
 174. Id. at 1256 (quoting Post, 7 F.3d at 1552).  See also Jones v. City of Dothan, 121 F.3d 1456, 
1460–61 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 175. Nolin, 207 F.3d at 1256 (quoting Gold v. City of Miami, 121 F.3d 1442, 1446–47 (11th Cir. 
1997)). 
 176. 369 F.3d 1270, 1277–78 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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parenthetical from Lee, which in turn relied on a pre-Graham, pre-
Hudson decision, the Draper court articulated a tripartite test refining a 
Graham-like totality of the circumstances excessive-force analysis.177  
The court instructed that when “‘determining if force was reasonable, 
courts must examine (1) the need for the application of force, (2) the 
relationship between the need and amount of force used, and (3) the 
extent of the injury inflicted.’”178  The Eleventh Circuit declared 
reasonable a police officer’s use of a Taser stun gun because the arrestee 
was “hostile, belligerent, and uncooperative” and did not suffer a 
“serious injury.”179 
e. The District of Columbia Circuit 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has indicated that 
the Graham test is the appropriate analytical framework.  It has also 
opined, however, that the quantum of injury an arrestee sustains is a 
consideration when determining whether an arrestee asserts a cognizable 
excessive-force claim.  For example, in Johnson v. District of Columbia, 
the court began its analysis of an excessive-force claim by quoting the 
Graham framework as the applicable controlling law.180  The D.C. 
Circuit further affixed an additional group of factors to consider when 
examining excessive-force claims.  Quoting a pre-Graham case, the 
court stated that “‘such factors as the need for the application of force, 
the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, 
[and] the extent of injury inflicted’” should also guide a Fourth 
Amendment excessive-force analysis.181 
A year later, in Wasserman v. Rodacker, an arrestee alleged that a 
police officer placed her hand on the arrestee’s shoulder, “forced [his] 
arm behind his back, handcuffed him, and placed him under arrest.”182  
The D.C. Circuit began its analysis by laying out the Graham 
framework.183  After analyzing the facts of the case in light of Graham, 
                                                          
 177. Id. (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1191 (11th Cir. 2002)). 
 178. Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Lee, 284 F.3d at 1188). 
 179. Id. at 1273, 1278.  But see Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 908 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that a police officer used excessive force where he tasered an arrestee between eight and eleven 
times over a two-minute period and the arrestee died). 
 180. 528 F.3d 969, 974 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 181. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). 
 182. 557 F.3d 635, 636–37 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 183. Id. at 641. 
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the D.C. Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the police 
officer by finding that the arrestee “suffered no bruise or injury, which 
tends to confirm that [the police officer] did not use ‘more force than 
reasonably appeared necessary’ to secure [the arrestee’s] compliance.”184 
The district court has dutifully employed this “tends to confirm” 
review when noting the quantum of injury arrestees suffered in 
excessive-force claims.  For example, in Cromartie v. District of 
Columbia, an arrestee alleged that he was forced to the ground while 
being placed under arrest and restrained with handcuffs, which caused a 
“minor injury to [the arrestee’s] wrist.”185  In granting summary 
judgment on the arrestee’s excessive-force claim, the district court 
conducted a cursory, Graham-like analysis of the facts and concluded 
that, under the circumstances of the arrest, the force that the police 
officer used was not excessive.186  The court noted that the arrestee’s 
“minor injuries to his wrists further undermine[d] his excessive force 
claim.”187 
3. Circuits that Strictly Follow the Graham Analysis and Do Not 
Consider the Arrestee’s Injury  
a. The First Circuit 
Though the First Circuit has only once explored the de minimis 
injury concept as it related to a larger analysis of a Fourth Amendment 
excessive-force claim, it has not adopted or employed a de minimis 
injury exception in such claims.  In finding that a district court’s jury 
instruction was flawed because it included a “serious injury” requirement 
for an excessive-force claim, the First Circuit initially noted that liability 
can clearly be imposed absent a “serious injury.”188  The court then 
announced the proper analysis of a Fourth Amendment excessive-force 
claim by requiring a review of whether the defendant’s actions were 
“‘objectively reasonable, viewed in light of the facts and circumstances 
confronting him and without regard to his underlying intent or 
                                                          
 184. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 760 (D.C. Cir. 
1996)). 
 185. 729 F. Supp. 2d 281, 284 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 186. Id. at 286. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Bastien v. Goddard, 279 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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motivation.’”189  The court listed the relevant factors articulated in the 
Graham decision,190 but then stated that the “severity of the [plaintiff’s] 
injury also may be considered.”191  The court clearly instructed that 
Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims are “‘not precluded merely 
because only minor injuries were inflicted’” upon the plaintiff.192  The 
court’s only reference to de minimis injuries came in a footnote 
supporting this point and discussing the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of de 
minimis injuries.193  Indeed, each Fourth Amendment excessive-force 
case the First Circuit has reviewed since Bastien has simply referred to 
the Graham analysis as the proper analysis.194 
b. The Seventh Circuit 
While not referring to the exception by name, the Seventh Circuit 
has rejected the theory that a plaintiff cannot establish a Fourth 
Amendment excessive-force claim by alleging only a de minimis injury.  
For example, in Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel Crest, the plaintiff 
alleged that during a traffic stop, a police officer “administered one 
violent poke and push, and said to [the plaintiff], ‘[W]e know what to do 
with you.’”195  The district court granted the motion to dismiss, and the 
plaintiff appealed.196  The Seventh Circuit favorably noted and affirmed 
the district court’s recognition that “an excessive force claim does not 
require an injury, and therefore [the plaintiff] need not have been injured 
to have an excessive force claim.”197 
More recently, the Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the argument 
that an injury is a prerequisite to a Fourth Amendment excessive-force 
claim.198  In Baird v. Renbarger, the plaintiffs alleged that a police 
officer used excessive force by wielding a submachine gun to effectuate 
                                                          
 189. Id. (quoting Alexis v. McDonald’s Rests. of Mass., 67 F.3d 341, 352 (1st Cir. 1995)). 
 190. Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). 
 191. Id. (citing Dean v. City of Worcester, 924 F.2d 364, 369 (1st Cir. 1991)). 
 192. Id. (quoting Alexis, 67 F.3d at 352). 
 193. Id. at 14 n.7 (citing Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 314 (5th Cir. 2001)). 
 194. See, e.g., Raiche v. Pietroski, 623 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2010); Morelli v. Webster, 552 F.3d 
12, 23 (1st Cir. 2009); Jennings v. Jones, 499 F.3d 2, 11 (1st Cir. 2007); Flowers v. Fiore, 359 F.3d 
24, 34 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 195. 110 F.3d 467, 474 (7th Cir. 1997) (second alteration in original). 
 196. Id. at 470–71. 
 197. Id. at 470 n.3 (citing 913 F. Supp. 1202, 1209 (N.D. Ill. 1996)). 
 198. Baird v. Renbarger, 576 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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a search warrant despite the nonviolent nature of the suspected crime and 
the lack of suspicion that the suspects were armed or dangerous.199  After 
discussing Graham’s “objective reasonableness” test, the court 
specifically foreclosed a de minimis injury exception in the Seventh 
Circuit by holding that “[p]laintiffs need not show physical injury in 
order to sustain an excessive force claim.”200  The appropriate analysis, 
the court reasoned, considers “whether [the seizure] was objectively 
reasonable, judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 
scene.”201 
Few district courts in the Seventh Circuit have been presented with 
the argument that a de minimis injury cannot support a Fourth 
Amendment excessive-force claim.  Of the district courts that have dealt 
with the issue, the court’s decision in Davis v. Peoria County is 
representative of the district courts’ acknowledgment of the Seventh 
Circuit’s approach to the de minimis injury exception.  In Davis, the 
plaintiff alleged that during a confrontation that lasted between one and 
two minutes, police officers threw her to the ground, pulled her arm 
behind her back, kneed her in the thigh, and bit her shoulder.202  An 
examination by a nurse determined that the plaintiff’s “right wrist and 
left cheek were slightly swollen, and that her right outer thigh was 
reddened.”203  After being released from jail, the plaintiff visited a doctor 
who found that she “had pain, swelling, and bruising or a contusion of 
her right wrist, blunt injuries, and moderate elevation of systolic blood 
pressure.”204 
In support of a de minimis injury exception, the defendants relied on 
the Seventh Circuit’s Pattern Jury Instructions for Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment excessive-force claims.205  The jury instructions, the 
defendants argued, permitted a jury to consider the harm a plaintiff 
sustained when determining whether a particular use of force was 
objectively reasonable.206  As a result, the police officer posited that an 
arrestee must have incurred more than a de minimis injury to have a valid 
                                                          
 199. Id. at 342–44. 
 200. Id. at 344. 
 201. Id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). 
 202. No. 08-cv-1118, 2009 WL 3258318, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2009). 
 203. Id. at *2. 
 204. Id. at *3. 
 205. Id. at *5. 
 206. Id. 
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excessive-force claim.207  In rejecting the police officer’s argument, the 
district court reasoned that the committee comments appended to the 
instructions “express[ed] reservations about the use of the ‘harm’ 
element, citing case law strongly suggesting that ‘harm’ to the [arrestee] 
is not an element of an excessive force claim.”208  The court held that 
even if the arrestee suffered only de minimis injuries, it does not 
necessarily follow that she is unable to succeed on a Fourth Amendment 
excessive-force claim.209 
c. The Ninth Circuit 
Though it has never directly entertained an argument in support of a 
de minimis injury exception to Fourth Amendment excessive-force 
claims, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that it would likely reject the 
idea.210  In Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, police 
officers used pepper spray against protesters who were practicing 
nonviolent civil disobedience.211  The district court granted the 
defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law and reasoned that the 
use of pepper spray only minimally intruded upon the protestors’ bodily 
integrity because “it did not involve the threat of ‘deadly force or 
even . . . a significant level of physical force.’”212  Instead, the district 
court held that the force simply resulted in “‘transient pain without 
significant risk of physical injury.’”213  The Ninth Circuit reversed and 
held that although a plaintiff may only be entitled to nominal damages if 
he has not incurred an actual injury, he may nevertheless have a valid 
Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim.214  The court observed that the 
proper analysis of a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim begins 
with the Graham objective-reasonableness test and its accompanying 
                                                          
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. (quoting FED. CIV. JURY INSTR. 7TH CIR. § 7.08 cmt. (2005)). 
 209. Id. at *6.  The court did not clearly determine whether the Fourth Amendment or the 
Fourteenth Amendment governed plaintiff’s claims; instead, the court analyzed whether the force 
used was objectively reasonable.  Id. 
 210. See, e.g., Headwaters Forest Def. v. Cnty. of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185, 1205 (9th Cir. 
2000), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 534 U.S. 801 (2001). 
 211. Id. at 1194–95. 
 212. Id. at 1199 (quoting Headwaters Forest Def. v. County of Humboldt, No. C-97-3989-VRW, 
1998 WL 754575, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 1998)). 
 213. Id. (quoting Headwaters, 1998 WL 754575 at *4). 
 214. Id. at 1198–99 (citing Lavez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 640 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
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factors.215  In describing the heart of the analysis, the court focused on 
the force the police officer uses balanced against the need for the 
force.216  Notably absent from both the court’s list of Graham factors, as 
well as the court’s characterization of the heart of the Graham analysis, 
was a focus on the quantum of injury the arrestee sustained.217  The 
court, however, did not completely reject this consideration.218  Instead, 
the court determined that the nature and risk of injury a particular type of 
force poses is a factor that may be considered when evaluating the need 
for force.219 
A year later, however, in Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation 
Agency, the Ninth Circuit seemed to open the door to including an 
analysis of whether an arrestee suffered an actual injury in an excessive-
force claim.220  In Arpin, an arrestee stiffened her arm and attempted to 
pull free from the arresting officer’s grasp while being placed in 
handcuffs.221  The arrestee alleged that as a result of the arresting 
officer’s use of force in the course of handcuffing her, she suffered an 
injury.222  The district court held that the police officer’s use of force was 
objectively reasonable under the circumstances and granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant.223  In reviewing the district court’s 
decision, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the plaintiff’s excessive-force claim 
by citing to and articulating the Graham “‘objective reasonableness’” 
test, along with its standard accompanying factors.224  The court found 
that the arrestee’s legally impermissible resistance rendered the police 
officer’s use of force objectively reasonable.225  The court further noted 
that the plaintiff “[did] not provide any medical records to support her 
claim that she suffered injury as a result of being handcuffed,” which 
weakened her claim.226  Thus, the plaintiff “failed to meet her burden of 
                                                          
 215. Id. at 1198 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)). 
 216. Id. at 1199 (quoting Liston v. Cnty. of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 976 n.10 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 217. See id. (quoting Liston, 120 F.3d at 976). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. 261 F.3d 912, 921–22 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 221. Id. at 921 (noting that arrestee did not refute police officer’s report that arrestee “stiffened 
her arm and attempted to pull it away”). 
 222. Id. at 922. 
 223. Id. at 921. 
 224. Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 396 (1989)). 
 225. See id. (citing United States v. Span, 970 F.2d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 226. Id. at 922 (citing Foster v. Metro. Airports Comm’n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1082 (8th Cir. 1990)). 
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proof of providing specific facts to show that the force used was 
unreasonable or that she sustained actual injuries.”227 
The court’s inclusion of the lack of “actual injuries” as support for 
affirming summary judgment seems to have been simply an additional 
reason that does not stand alone.  The court appears to have merely 
summarized the lack of evidence that supported the claims of excessive 
force and injury.  Indeed, the court could have supported its affirmation 
of summary judgment in favor of the police officer by simply concluding 
that the plaintiff failed to provide specific facts to show that the force 
used was unreasonable.  Nevertheless, as has become the problem with 
the circuits’ imprecision regarding the proper place for a review of an 
arrestee’s injury, the district courts within the Ninth Circuit have cited to 
this portion of the Arpin decision and applied it inconsistently.228 
While the court’s opinion in Arpin arguably justified the district 
court’s analysis of whether an arrestee sustained “actual injuries” in a 
Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, in Bryan v. MacPherson, the 
court reaffirmed Headwaters Forest Defense by stating that “force can be 
unreasonable even without physical blows or injuries.”229  The Bryan 
court was faced with determining whether the use of a Taser stun gun 
could constitute excessive force.230  The plaintiff in Bryan suffered 
fractured teeth and facial contusions as a result of falling to the ground 
after the defendant police officer’s Taser incapacitated him.231  The court 
nonetheless examined whether the experience of being stunned by the 
Taser is independently of a nature and quality that can give rise to an 
excessive force claim.232  After describing a Taser’s mechanical 
operation, the court discussed the effects of the weapon on a target.233  
                                                          
 227. Id. (emphasis added). 
 228. Compare Halbert v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 07cv1607-L(WVG), 2010 WL 1292163, at 
*13 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2010) (explaining that in Arpin “summary judgment for the defense was not 
based solely on the plaintiff’s failure to support her claim of injury with medical records” (citing 
Arpin, 261 F.3d at 922)), with Brooks v. Haggett, No. C 07-2615 SBA (PR), 2009 WL 688855, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2009) (noting that Arpin stands for the rule that an “injury claim cannot survive 
summary judgment where plaintiff provides no medical records to support claim that she was injured 
as a result of being handcuffed” (citing Arpin, 961 F.3d at 922)). 
 229. Bryan, 630 F.3d 805, 824 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Headwaters Forest Def. v. Cnty. of 
Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185, 1199 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 534 U.S. 
801 (2001); Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 845 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 230. Id. at 809. 
 231. Id. at 822. 
 232. See id. at 810–12. 
 233. Id. at 824–26. 
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The court noted the “physiological effects, the high levels of pain, and 
foreseeable risk of physical injury” in rejecting the defendant’s argument 
that because those effects are only temporary, they constitute an 
insignificant level of force.234  To the contrary, although the court 
recognized the utility of Tasers, it held that the intense pain, 
immobilization, disorientation, loss of balance, and weakness they cause 
can constitute excessive force pursuant to an analysis of the 
circumstances under which they are deployed.235 
4. Wilkins v. Gaddy 
Recently, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the 
viability of a de minimis injury exception to excessive-force claims 
within the Eighth Amendment context, thus revisiting Hudson.  In 
Wilkins v. Gaddy, a prisoner filed a pro se complaint alleging that a 
corrections officer threw him onto a concrete floor and “‘proceeded to 
punch, kick, knee[,] and choke’” him.236  The complaint further alleged 
that the prisoner suffered “‘a bruised heel, lower back pain, increased 
blood pressure, as well as migraine headaches and dizziness’ and 
‘psychological trauma and mental anguish including depression, panic 
attacks[,] and nightmares of the assault.’”237  In applying Fourth Circuit 
precedent, the district court dismissed the complaint because plaintiff’s 
allegations of a bruised heel, back pains, and headaches were no more 
than de minimis injuries.238  The Fourth Circuit affirmed.239 
In reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
Hudson.240  The Court began by recounting its Hudson decision and why 
the Fifth Circuit’s decision that gave rise to Hudson was in error.241  The 
Court noted that constitutional deficiency arose from the Fifth Circuit’s 
imposing a “‘significant injury’” requirement on Eighth Amendment 
excessive-force claims and holding that the prisoner’s injuries were “too 
                                                          
 234. Id. at 825. 
 235. See id. at 825–26. 
 236. 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1177 (2010) (per curiam). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 1179. 
 239. Id. at 1177–78 (quoting 308 F. App’x 696 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), rev’d 130 S. Ct. 
1175). 
 240. Id. at 1177. 
 241. Id. at 1178. 
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‘minor’ to warrant relief.”242  Instead, the Court reiterated that the “‘core 
judicial inquiry’ . . . was not whether a certain quantum of injury was 
sustained, but rather ‘whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to 
maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause 
harm.’”243  The core judicial inquiry focuses on force, the Court 
reasoned, because an inmate does not lose his or her Eighth Amendment 
rights to be free from excessive force simply because he or she is 
fortunate enough to “escape without serious injury.”244  Indeed, 
recognizing a de minimis injury exception to Eighth Amendment 
excessive-force claims “improperly bypasses this core inquiry.”245  
However, the court did not dismiss the implication of a lack of injury.246  
The quantum of injury may be useful as a factor to determine whether 
the force could have been thought necessary or may “provide some 
indication of the amount of force applied.”247  Allegations of de minimis 
force coupled with “no discernible injury almost certainly fail[] to state a 
valid excessive force claim.”248 
D. A De Minimis Injury Exception to Fourth Amendment Excessive-
Force Claims Permits an Unconstitutional Focus on the Arrestee’s 
Injury 
1. The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence Demonstrates that the De 
Minimis Injury Exception Lacks a Constitutional Basis  
Taken together, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding 
excessive force, regardless of the applicable amendment, demonstrates 
that there is no constitutional basis for a de minimis injury exception to 
Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims.  While some circuits 
continue to require or permit an analysis of the extent of the physical or 
psychological injury the arrestee incurs, a court’s analysis cannot turn on 
the magnitude of the injury.  Instead, the analysis must focus on the force 
used and its objective reasonableness under the circumstances.  Indeed, 
                                                          
 242. Id. (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 929 F.2d 1014, 1015 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)). 
 243. Id. (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). 
 244. Id. at 1178–79. 
 245. Id. at 1179 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9). 
 246. Id. at 1178 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9). 
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those circuits that require or permit district courts to grant dispositive 
motions in favor of a defendant because the plaintiff lacks some physical 
or psychological injury ignore the dictates of Hudson, Wilkins, and, more 
applicable, Graham. 
Hudson and Wilkins, though discussing Eighth Amendment 
excessive-force claims, nevertheless demonstrated the pragmatic 
implication of examining the injury an arrestee incurs.  In discussing the 
validity of requiring a significant injury for a cognizable Eighth 
Amendment excessive-force claim, the Hudson Court realized that some 
force, by its very nature, may be unlikely to cause a physical injury.249  
Requiring that a plaintiff sustain some indefinite amount of injury will 
overlook some constitutional violations of a citizen’s right to be free 
from excessive force.250  Indeed, focusing on and requiring an injury 
avoids imposing constitutional liability by permitting force “no matter 
how diabolic or inhuman, [so long as it] inflict[s] less than some 
arbitrary quantity of injury.”251  This reality must confine the 
jurisprudence of Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims to just what 
the claim suggests—that the state used unnecessary and disproportionate 
force in arresting an otherwise free citizen.  To do otherwise would place 
in the state’s hands the power to use virtually any amount or manner of 
force to detain its citizens.  To be sure, the Graham decision itself 
requires nothing less than an absolute prohibition of the de minimis 
injury exception to Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims. 
As discussed above, when articulating the proper analysis for a 
Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, the Court in Graham placed 
its focus on the police officer’s actions252—the very actions that manifest 
the force used to detain an arrestee.  The Graham Court, like in Wilkins, 
determined that the proper constitutional analysis lay not in the result of 
the force, but instead in whether the police officer’s actions and 
concomitant force used to detain the arrestee were “‘objectively 
reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [the 
                                                          
 249. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 
128, 137–39 (1978); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)); see also Bryan N. Georgiady, Note, An 
Excessively Painful Encounter: The Reasonableness of Pain and De Minimis Injuries for Fourth 
Amendment Excessive Force Claims, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 123, 151 (2008) (citing Graham, 490 
U.S. at 388). 
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officer].”253  The analysis, therefore, revolves around what occurred 
between the police officer and the arrestee at the time of the arrest and 
the degree of force chosen to detain the arrestee.  It does not consider the 
“post-force” damage caused by the force. 
To facilitate the analysis of whether the force itself was excessive, 
the Court articulated several factors.254  Those factors also focus on 
whether the force was appropriate in light of the situation the police 
officer faced at the time of the arrest.255  The factors do not assess the 
continuing physical or psychological impact of the force on the 
arrestee.256  Instead, the factors examine the circumstances confronting 
the police officer before he or she decided to use force to detain the 
arrestee and whether the degree of force used was more than was 
necessary under those circumstances.257  The magnitude of the injury an 
arrestee sustained sheds no light on whether the amount of force a police 
officer used was disproportionate to the need for force.258  During those 
moments in which a police officer uses force, it is either excessive or not 
excessive based on the circumstances facing the officer.259  Any 
continuing injury or lack of injury that occurs after the use of force is 
purely a by-product of the force and temporally unrelated to whether the 
degree of force was appropriate.  Certainly, the Graham Court had the  
opportunity to adopt a test that reviewed, among other things, the extent 
of the injury the arrestee sustained.260  It passed on the offer.261 
                                                          
 253. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (citing Scott, 436 U.S. at 137–39; Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). 
 254. The Court required consideration of “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect 
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting 
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”  Id. at 396 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–
9 (1985)). 
 255. Id. (“[P]roper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each 
particular case.”). 
 256. See id.; see also Bartram v. Wolfe, 152 F. Supp. 2d 898, 903 n.7 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) 
(“[T]he focus is on the objective reasonableness of the force used, not the scale of the injury.”  
(citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 208 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009))). 
 257. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; see also Gulley v. Elizabeth City Police Dep’t., No. 04-4445 
(JLL), 2006 WL 3694588, at *8 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2006) (“[T]he focus is on the extent of the force 
applied . . . .”), aff’d, No. 07-1124, 2009 WL 2219266 (3d Cir. July 27, 2009). 
 258. For example, a police officer firing his gun at a suspected, but otherwise peaceful, 
jaywalker would be no less responsible for using excessive force if the jaywalker was fortunate 
enough to avoid being hit by the bullet. 
 259. See, e.g., Mickle v. Ahmed, 444 F. Supp. 2d 601, 619 (D.S.C. 2006) (recognizing that “[t]he 
focus is on reasonableness at the moment” of the arrest (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396)). 
 260. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 390–92. 
 261. See id. at 396. 
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2. Courts that Require an Arrestee Suffer Some Quantum of Injury 
Append an Added Harm to a Stand-Alone, Constitutional Violation 
To inject a review and determination of the amount of physical or 
psychological injury an arrestee sustains into the analysis of a Fourth 
Amendment excessive-force claim is akin to crossbreeding modern tort 
burdens—which requires a physical or psychological harm—with a 
constitutional claim.262  One’s constitutional right to be free from 
excessive force while being arrested is a right unto itself263—a right that 
can be violated without regard to any physical or psychological injury.  
The “‘intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’”264 is 
the harm a free citizen suffers when excessive force is used to detain 
him.265  The intrusion itself carries with it liability for the state as the 
intruder.266  The violation of this right, then, cannot be tied to a modern 
tort prerequisite that requires and examines the magnitude of the physical 
or psychological impact of the violation.  Indeed, a mingling of modern 
tort expectations regarding injury with Fourth Amendment rights is 
precisely what appears to be taking place in those circuits that require an 
injury or recognize a de minimis injury exception to Fourth Amendment 
excessive-force claims.267 
Nowhere is this better demonstrated than the Fifth Circuit’s 
reintroduction of the concept of “serious injury”—though using a 
different adjective—into the analysis of Fourth Amendment excessive-
force claims.  In Flores,268 the Fifth Circuit held that psychological 
injuries could be used to establish the circuit’s “injury” requirement for 
Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims.269  The Fifth Circuit, 
                                                          
 262. See Georgiady, supra note 252, at 158–59. 
 263. See generally id. at 1661 n.253 (discussing Professor Anthony Amsterdam’s assessment of 
the “atomistic” view of the Fourth Amendment as compared with the “regulatory” view of the 
Fourth Amendment (quoting Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 
MINN. L. REV. 349, 374 (1974))). 
 264. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). 
 265. See id. (balancing the citizen’s interest “against the countervailing governmental interests at 
stake” (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 8)). 
 266. See Georgiady, supra note 252, at 159 (“[O]fficers may only be held liable in tort if their 
conduct is first determined to be violative of a known constitutional right.” (citing Saucier v. Katz, 
533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 
(2009)). 
 267. See generally Georgiady, supra note 252, at 158–59. 
 268. See supra Part II.C.1.a. 
 269. Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 400–01 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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however, seemed to adopt a burden of proof similar to that imposed on a 
plaintiff in a tort claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress.270  In 
holding that psychological injuries could satisfy the circuit’s “injury” 
requirement, the court found that minor psychological injuries alone 
could not be the basis of a valid claim.271  Instead, psychological injuries 
must be “substantial . . . [to] satisfy the injury element” of a Fourth 
Amendment claim.272  The Fifth Circuit noted that the plaintiff alleged 
“post-traumatic stress disorder, mental anguish, headaches, and 
nightmares” as a result of the excessive force.273  Apparently, these are 
the significant psychological injuries that could meet the test articulated 
in Flores.274  Other psychological harms, such as the fright experienced 
while being subjected to excessive force; intense but nonpermanent pain 
resulting from the use of excessive force; or a general distrust of the state 
and its use of police powers after experiencing excessive force would 
seemingly not rise to the level of a “substantial injury.”  Nevertheless, by 
reintroducing an obligatory higher quantum of injury for psychological 
injuries, Flores reveals the Fifth Circuit’s fixation on imposing modern 
tort burdens and expectations upon Fourth Amendment excessive-force 
claims. 
Certainly, a tort claim like negligent infliction of emotional distress 
protects an injured party’s interest in being made whole as a result of 
another’s causing him a loss.275  A Fourth Amendment claim, however, 
protects one’s individual interest in not being subjected to excessive 
force while being arrested.276  The state’s use of more force than is 
necessary to effectuate the arrest of a free citizen, by itself, is a harm for 
which a plaintiff may seek redress.  Therefore, the analysis of a Fourth 
                                                          
 270. Compare id. at 400–01, with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 A (1965) (“If the 
actor’s conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or 
emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily 
harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance.”), and id. 
§ 313. 
 271. See Flores, 381 F.3d at 400–01. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at 395. 
 274. See id. at 399 (stating that plaintiff sufficiently alleged a claim). 
 275. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313(1) (1965) (“If the actor unintentionally causes 
emotional distress to another, he is subject to liability to the other for resulting illness or bodily 
harm . . . .”). 
 276. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).  But see Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives 
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 369 (1974) (contending that “the regulation of 
police behavior is what the [F]ourth [A]mendment is all about”). 
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Amendment excessive-force claim must focus only on the amount of 
force used, irrespective of the resulting injury.  Including a requirement 
that some injury results from the excessive force simply adds a second 
harm to which the victim must be subjected.  This addition of a second 
required harm ignores a free citizen’s free-standing constitutional interest 
in being free from the state’s use of excessive force during an arrest. 
Similar to the requirement of a substantial injury in the Fifth Circuit, 
the Eleventh Circuit has implicitly reintroduced the concept of 
“significant injury.”277  As part of its analysis of excessive-force claims, 
the Eleventh Circuit requires an examination of  “the extent of the injury 
inflicted”278 yet fails to specifically define the quantum of injury 
required.  District courts left wondering what level of injury is necessary 
are forced to comb through cases like Draper for clues.  Their search will 
reveal that the Eleventh Circuit, in part, supported its conclusion that the 
police officer’s use of force in Draper was not excessive because it “did 
not inflict any serious injury.”279  Indeed, district courts in the Eleventh 
Circuit, at least in the context of the use of Tasers like in Draper, are 
likely to find that so long as an arrestee’s injuries are not serious, the 
extent of the injury is de minimis.280 
The Supreme Court must, as it did in the context of the Eighth 
Amendment, explicitly state that a de minimis injury exception does not 
exist within the context of Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims.  If 
the Court fails to do so, district courts will continue to review the 
magnitude of an arrestee’s injuries despite the dictates of Graham, as 
was the case with Hudson until Wilkins.  Indeed, as is demonstrated 
above, district courts will continue to review the magnitude of an 
arrestee’s injuries even in those circuits that have implicitly or explicitly 
rejected such a review.  For example, while the Second281 and Sixth 
Circuits282 have rejected an examination of the amount of injury an 
arrestee sustained as part of a Fourth Amendment claim, district courts in 
those circuits have nonetheless incorporated the de minimis injury 
                                                          
 277. See supra Part II.C.2.d.; see, e.g., Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(per curiam). 
 278. Id. at 1291 (quoting Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2008)). 
 279. Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). 
 280. See id. 
 281. See supra Part II.C.2.a. 
 282. See supra Part II.C.2.c. 
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exception into their analyses.283  Failing to reaffirm the lack of an 
examination of the arrestee’s injury in the Graham analysis permits the 
consideration of the quantum of injury sustained by an arrestee.  This 
will, in turn, lead to additional exceptions based on an arrestee’s lack of 
injury.  Indeed, exceptions like the Eighth Circuit’s heightened pleading 
requirements in handcuffing cases may be employed in other 
circumstances.  As new, nonlethal weapons are created and their effects 
prove difficult to measure, courts will likely create a new patchwork of 
tests perhaps requiring long-term, permanent, serious, or substantial 
injuries. 
III. THE DE MINIMIS INJURY EXCEPTION TO FOURTH AMENDMENT 
EXCESSIVE-FORCE CLAIMS MUST BE ABANDONED BECAUSE 
FUTURE NONLETHAL WEAPONS WILL NOT CAUSE THE QUANTUM 
OF INJURY NECESSARY TO OVERCOME THE EXCEPTION 
A. Background 
The folly of recognizing a de minimis injury exception to Fourth 
Amendment excessive-force claims emerges clearly when one reviews 
new nonlethal-weapon technology.  Undoubtedly, the development and 
use of nonlethal weapons is on the rise.284  Indeed, with the confluence of 
the “War on Terror,” military spending, and private contractors vying for 
development rights, it is only a matter of time before cutting edge 
technologies appear in the hands of domestic law enforcement.285  If the 
rise in the use and reliance on Tasers is any indication,286 once 
introduced, domestic law enforcement will employ these technologies 
with vigor.  Indeed, as is discussed below, the drive to develop new 
nonlethal weapons illustrates the need to consider not only the 
                                                          
 283. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Chattanooga, No. 1:08-cv-63, 2009 WL 3762961, at *8 (E.D. 
Tenn. Nov. 4, 2009); Li v. Aponte, No. 05 Civ. 6237(NRB), 2008 WL 4308127, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 16, 2008); Williams v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 10230(SAS), 2007 WL 2214390, at *12 
(S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2007); Lee v. Ritter, No. 1:02-CV-282, 2005 WL 3369616, at *7 n.3 (E.D. Tenn. 
Dec. 12, 2005). 
 284. See Nick Lewer & Neil Davison, Non-Lethal Technologies: An Overview, DISARMAMENT 
F., no. 1, 2005, at 37, 37. 
 285. Don Hummer, Policing and “Hard” Technology, in NEW TECHNOLOGY OF CRIME, LAW 
AND SOCIAL CONTROL 133, 133 (James M. Byrne & Donald J. Rebovich eds., 2007). 
 286. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S USE OF LESS-
LETHAL WEAPONS 15 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/plus/e0903/final.pdf; 
Connie Paige, Police Report Expanded Use of Tasers, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 22, 2009, at 1. 
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constitutional basis for the de minimis injury exception, but the practical 
basis as well.  As a result, understanding these nonlethal weapons and the 
injury—or lack of injury—they cause is key to discussing the practical  
viability of a de minimis injury exception to Fourth Amendment 
excessive-force claims. 
Any discussion of nonlethal weapons, however, requires a standard 
definition of the term, as it inevitably provokes various ideas and 
preconceptions depending on one’s point of view.287  This portion of the 
Article discusses those weapons that “are designed not to destroy or kill 
but to incapacitate.”288  Stated differently, it focuses on those weapons 
that are intended to avoid fatalities289 or drastically minimize or eliminate 
the physical injury that suspects suffer when taken into custody.290  
Because virtually any nonlethal weapon could cause fatalities,291 this 
discussion focuses on those weapons whose intended purpose and design 
are as described above.  This Article further focuses on the avant-garde 
technologies that have only recently been introduced to domestic law 
enforcement and that are in the development or initial stage of 
deployment, often in military theaters. 
Nonlethal weapons come in various forms and are categorized in 
various ways.  Most common nonlethal weapons are categorized based 
on the means by which the technology is delivered to the target or by 
which the target is incapacitated.292  For example, kinetic-energy 
technologies are one of the more commonly known forms of nonlethal 
weapons that domestic law enforcement often uses.293  Weapons such as 
police batons, water cannons, and rubber bullets fall into this category.294  
Additionally, chemical and biological technologies can be used as 
nonlethal weapons.  Chemical nonlethal weapons such as pepper spray 
have been widely used for some time;295 other chemical nonlethal 
                                                          
 287. David P. Fidler, The International Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal Weapons,” 21 MICH. 
J. INT’L. L. 51, 55 (1999). 
 288. Id. (citing JOHN B. ALEXANDER, FUTURE WAR: NON-LETHAL WEAPONS IN MODERN 
WARFARE 1 (1999)). 
 289. James C. Duncan, A Primer on the Employment of Non-Lethal Weapons, 45 NAVAL L. REV. 
1, 5 (1998). 
 290. See Hummer, supra note 285, at 134. 
 291. Fidler, supra note 287, at 59. 
 292. Id. at 60; see Lewer & Davison, supra note 284, at 38 tbl. 1. 
 293. See Lewer & Davison, supra note 284, at 40. 
 294. Id. at 38. 
 295. Hummer, supra note 285, at 135 (noting that no other nonlethal weapon is used by more 
police departments and that police departments began experimenting with pepper spray in the early 
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weapons focus on destroying crops, structures, or vehicles.296  Biological 
nonlethal weapons are less likely to be developed and converted for use 
by domestic law enforcement because the international Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC) bans the development and production of 
biological weapons.297  Furthermore, the BWC does not make a 
distinction between nonlethal and lethal biological weapons.298 
There has been a noteworthy amount of research into the use of 
sound waves as an acoustic nonlethal weapon.299  Sound has been used as 
a rudimentary nonlethal weapon in well-known situations.  For example, 
the U.S. military used loud music to drive General Manuel Noriega out 
of his refuge without resorting to more destructive means.300  More 
technologically advanced uses of sound waves as nonlethal weapons are 
being developed.  The Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) and similar 
sound canons, deployed by the U.S. Navy, Britain, Israel, and the 
Pittsburgh police department, have been used to repel adversaries and 
disperse crowds.301  The LRAD’s intended use, however, is to “deliver 
audible warning messages over long ranges” and act as a hailing 
device.302  Indeed, the Department of Defense has categorized the LRAD 
as a communications device almost certainly because its use as a weapon 
can cause permanent damage to the target’s hearing.303 
Still other research has been focused on the development of a “sound 
gun” that would emit a focused beam of sound intended to disorient the 
target.304  The device would disrupt the balance system of the inner ear, 
causing the disorientation.305  Because of the risk of permanent hearing 
damage that acoustic nonlethal weapons pose and the limited potential 
                                                                                                                       
1990s). 
 296. Lewer & Davison, supra note 284, at 38 tbl. 1. 
 297. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Feb. 25, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 
583 [hereinafter BWC]; NEIL DAVISON, ‘NON-LETHAL’ WEAPONS 30 (Jim Whitman ed., 2009) 
(citing BWC, supra). 
 298. See DAVISON, supra note 297, at 30 (citing BWC, supra note 297). 
 299. Id. at 186–205. 
 300. TERESA A. MEADE, A HISTORY OF MODERN LATIN AMERICA 301 (2010). 
 301. DAVID A. KOPLOW, NONLETHAL WEAPONS 20 (2006); Marco Evers, The Weapon of 
Sound: Sonic Canon Gives Pirates an Earful, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Nov. 15, 2005), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,385048,00.html; Ian Urbina, Protestors Are Met 
by Tear Gas at G-20 Conference, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2009, at A10. 
 302. DAVISON, supra note 297, at 197; Lewer & Davison, supra note 284, at 41. 
 303. DAVISON, supra note 297, at 197–98. 
 304. ROBERT L. SNOW, TECHNOLOGY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 92 (2007). 
 305. Id. 
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for incapacitation, their widespread development and deployment by 
domestic police departments seems unlikely.306  The two nonlethal-
weapon technologies upon which this Article will focus, electrical and 
directed energy, appear to be the most advanced technologies available 
to domestic law-enforcement. 
B. Directed-Energy Nonlethal Weapons 
Directed-energy weapons, as defined by the Department of Defense, 
are those weapons that produce a beam of “‘concentrated 
electromagnetic energy or atomic or subatomic particles.’”307  The U.S. 
military considers these sorts of weapons part of their “electronic 
warfare” capabilities, as they involve “the use of electromagnetic and 
directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the 
enemy.”308  A commonly known electromagnetic-energy weapon is the 
millimeter wave used by the U. S. military’s Active Denial System.309  
The use of electromagnetic energy as a nonlethal weapon, however, also 
includes the deployment of high-power microwaves, low-power diode 
lasers, or high-energy chemical lasers.310  These sorts of electromagnetic 
energy can be classified into two groups: (1) “lasers [that] operat[e] in 
the visible, ultraviolet, or infrared part of the [electromagnetic] 
spectrum” and (2) “radio frequenc[ies], microwave[s], and millimet[er] 
wave beams.”311 
                                                          
 306. COMM. FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF NONLETHAL WEAPONS SCI. & TECH., NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, AN ASSESSMENT OF NONLETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 31 (2003); 
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at the target’s hearing, would resonate with body organs potentially causing physical damage.  
Lewer & Davison, supra note 284, at 42. 
 307. DAVISON, supra note 297, at 143 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DICTIONARY OF MILITARY 
AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 103 (2011), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_ 
02.pdf). 
 308. Duncan, supra note 289, at 7 n.22 (citing Memorandum of Policy No. 6 on Electronic 
Warfare from Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 1. (1993)). 
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1. Lasers 
The U. S. military has focused on the development and use of lasers 
as weapons since their discovery in 1960.312  During the 1980s, the 
military specifically focused on laser technology that would permanently 
blind a human target.313  In 1995, however, ratification of Protocol on 
Blinding Laser Weapons to the 1980 Convention on Conventional 
Weapons limited the military’s potential development of new laser 
weapons.314  Since 1995, research has continued into the development of 
“dazzling” lasers, or lasers that only temporarily blind the target, 
although several problems have arisen.315  For example, some dazzler 
prototypes were safe at point-blank range but difficult to deploy against a 
moving target, while others were only safe for a quarter of a second.316 
In July 2010, however, Laser Energetics, Inc., announced that it 
would manufacture the Dazer Laser for intended distribution to police 
departments and other agencies in the United States.317  The Dazer Laser 
emits a green laser that is intended to temporarily impair the target’s 
vision.318  In addition to temporary blindness, the target’s “equilibrium 
and awareness is impaired,” which can cause feelings of nausea similar 
to motion sickness, as the manufacturer reports.319  These symptoms 
begin almost immediately and can last seconds or “hours depending on 
the [target’s] physiology.”320  The Dazer Laser, according to the 
                                                          
 312. Id. at 146. 
 313. Id. at 147 (citing BENGT ANDERBERG & MYRON L. WOLBARSHT, LASER WEAPONS: THE 
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 318. Frequently Asked Questions, LASER ENERGETICS, http://www.laserenergetics.com/ 
dazerlaser_generalquestions.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 319. Introduction, NON-LETHAL DEFENSES, http://www.non-lethaldefenses.com/intro.htm (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Introduction, NON-LETHAL DEFENSES]. 
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manufacturer, is “safe at all ranges.”321  So long as it is operated within 
the manufacturer’s suggested guidelines, no permanent ocular damage 
will occur even if the target is subjected to the laser multiple times.322 
Other research has examined laser weapons’ inducement of other 
nonlethal physiological responses.323  For example, the U.S. Army 
specifically created and funded the Stress and Motivated Behavior 
Institute (SMBI) at New Jersey Medical School in 2002 to study the 
neurobiology of stress and anxiety.324  The SMBI’s charge, when it was 
created, was to develop new weapons to induce these feelings.325  To that 
end, the SMBI, along with various corporations and the U.S. Army, has 
been researching development of a nonlethal laser weapon that induces 
psychological and behavioral changes in the target.326  In addition, 
nonlethal weapon developers consider high-energy lasers a potential 
source for creating a kinetic shockwave through a laser-induced 
plasma.327  The plasma creates an ultrasonic pressure wave that causes 
pain and temporary paralysis by stimulating the nerves in a human 
target’s skin.328  Although the federal government reveals little about 
these sorts of nonlethal weapons, the Department of Defense budgeted 
approximately $4 million per year between 2007 and 2009 for research 
into laser-induced plasma.329 
2. Radio Frequencies, Microwaves, and Millimeter Wave Beams 
As early as the 1980s, military scientists considered the possibility of 
using radar and similar electromagnetic spectrums in nonlethal, directed-
energy weapons.330  The scientists hypothesized that these sorts of 
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electromagnetic energy waves could repel human targets by stimulating 
the nerves in the target’s skin.331  While a classified military program 
officially began in the early 1990s, the U.S. Air Force first announced its 
work toward developing the technology in 1998.332  In 2006, the 
Department of Defense announced its Active Denial System (ADS) and 
soon displayed it for media, government officials, and others.333 
The Department of Defense describes the ADS as a “counter-
personnel, non-lethal, directed-energy weapon” that can be mounted on a 
military truck or jeep. 334  It produces millimeter waves and uses an 
antenna to direct them toward the human target.335  When the millimeter 
wave energy strikes the target, it penetrates the skin approximately one 
sixty-fourth of an inch.336  The energy’s effect on the skin’s nerve 
endings causes “a heat sensation that within seconds becomes intolerable 
and forces the targeted individual to instinctively move.”337  The heat 
sensation ceases when the energy stops striking the skin either because 
the operator turns it off or the target escapes the beam.338  The operator 
can select from four power levels between twenty-five and one hundred 
percent of the weapon’s capacity and can deploy the weapon in bursts 
ranging in duration from one to six seconds.339  The Department of 
Defense reports that those who have been subjected to the ADS liken the 
experience to the wave of heat felt when opening a hot oven.340  Indeed, 
the feeling is so intense that the target’s reflexive response of attempting 
to flee the beam acts as one of the safety features.341  According to the 
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Department of Defense, there is “minimal risk of injury because of the 
shallow penetration depth of energy into the skin at this short 
wavelength, the safety features designed into the system and normal 
human instinctive reactions.”342  While the initial ADS prototype was a 
large device that must be mounted on a vehicle, the Department of 
Defense and the National Institute of Justice have invested in the 
research and development of a hand-held version.343  The goal is to 
create a shotgun-sized weapon that will generate the same sort of energy 
and have the same effect as the ADS.344 
C. Electrical Weapons 
While the genesis of nonlethal directed-energy weapons can be 
found in Department of Defense research and development, electrical 
nonlethal weapons have a more benign, yet also insidious, origin.345  As 
early as the 1930s in Argentina, electrical weapons evolved from 
farmers’ use of cattle prods to herd animals into a torture device used 
during interrogations.346  Indeed, in the 1950s, police forces in the 
southern United States used “shock batons” as a pain-inducing device to 
disperse crowds.347  Current electrical nonlethal weapons, however, are 
dissimilar to these early iterations.348  Instead, domestic police 
departments use modern electrical nonlethal weapons, or electromuscular 
disruption (EMD) technology, for their effect on human sensory and 
motor functions.349 
Modern EMD weapons, such as the Advanced Taser M-26 and Taser 
X-26, emit 50,000 volts of electricity that affect the somatic nervous 
system by stimulating the body’s motor nerves.350  Darts that attach to 
                                                          
 342. ADS Fact Sheet, supra note 334. 
 343. DAVISON, supra note 297, at 170. 
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 346. Id. 
 347. Id. (citing REX APPLEGATE, RIOT CONTROL—MATERIALS AND TECHNIQUES 223 (1969). 
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the target’s skin or clothes deliver the voltage.351  The darts are attached 
to thin insulated wires, which are in turn attached to a device that 
generates the electricity.352  When the device is activated, the electrical 
stimulation of the body’s motor nerves interferes with and impairs 
voluntary movement, causing involuntary muscle contractions and a loss 
of muscle control.353  The muscle contractions have been compared to 
those associated with strenuous activities such as weightlifting.354  
Though their safety is contested,355 one study of 1,201 people who had 
been the target of a modern EMD weapon found that in ninety-nine 
percent of cases the weapon caused no or mild injuries.356  In those cases 
where there was an injury, the majority of the injuries were “superficial 
puncture wounds” from the darts embedding into the target’s skin or 
blunt trauma from the target falling to the ground because of a loss of 
muscle control.357  Nevertheless, while modern EMD weapons are not 
intended to be pain-compliance weapons,358 the targets of EMD weapons 
often describe the experience as excruciatingly painful.359  It is likely that 
any future EMD weapon will incapacitate a target in similar ways; 
however, several companies are developing weapons that can deliver the 
incapacitating shock by way of a laser-created ionized gas or plasma. 360  
By delivering the electricity through an ionized gas or plasma, the EMD 
and the operator need not rely on projectiles and wires to deliver the 
shock.361 
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D. Advances in Nonlethal Weapon Technology Require an 
Abandonment of the De Minimis Injury Exception 
While not constitutionally sound, a de minimis injury exception to 
Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims may seem commonsensical.  
Employing a de minimis injury exception appears to reduce potentially 
frivolous excessive-force claims by arrestees.  In light of future nonlethal 
weapons on which police officers will likely rely to detain arrestees, 
however, a de minimis injury exception to such claims loses its luster.  
Indeed, if future nonlethal weapons are as enthusiastically adopted as the 
Taser,362 it is possible that police officers will almost exclusively rely on 
an arsenal of nonlethal devices to detain arrestees.  For those circuits that 
permit district courts to employ a de minimis injury exception or require 
some more-than-insignificant quantum of injury, a citizen’s right to be 
free from the state’s use of excessive force could soon evaporate. 
The future of nonlethal weapons lies in the development of devices 
that use pain, disorientation, temporary blindness, and perhaps even 
stress and anxiety to detain the target.  The laudable goal is to avoid 
causing physical injury while seizing and arresting the target.  With any 
confrontation between a police officer and an arrestee, however, there 
exists a possibility that the police officer will use more force than 
necessary to detain the citizen.  If the de minimis injury exception is 
employed, those who are subjected to these future nonlethal weapons 
may have little recourse because of the lack of a cognizable injury.  The 
temptation may arise for a district court judge, overwhelmed by a busy 
docket, to dismiss a case or grant summary judgment by relying on the 
arrestee’s lack of injury while giving mere lip service to Graham.  When 
police officers deploy new, cutting edge nonlethal weapons in the future, 
courts, like the district court in Wilkins,363 will have the opportunity to 
avoid difficult, constitutionally significant questions by focusing on the 
lack of injury the devices caused. 
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Future nonlethal weapons that cause little or no physiological 
damage, however, will require courts to consider the effect on the target, 
beyond whether there was more than some undefined quantum of injury.  
Gone will be the days when police use a nightstick to subdue an arrestee.  
As the state’s devices evolve, they will not cause the same sort of harm 
as a nightstick.  If courts rely on an oversimplified de minimis injury 
exception, they may overlook the harm an arrestee sustains when a police 
officer uses excessive force.  Instead, courts will need to consider 
whether the effects of a nonlethal weapon, while perhaps not easily 
quantified, were nonetheless more than was necessary to subdue the 
arrestee. 
For example, nonlethal weapons that cause temporary blindness may 
initially subdue an arrestee.  The blindness caused, however, must only 
last as long as is necessary under the circumstances.364  Even where the 
arrestee’s eyes are physically unharmed, the blindness may be no longer 
than is necessary in light of either the severity of the suspected crime or 
the threat the suspect poses to the safety of the officers or others.365  
Similarly, future nonlethal weapons that are designed to cause stress or 
anxiety must not interfere with an arrestee’s normal psychological 
behavior any longer than is necessary to subdue a suspect who is actively 
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest.366  Certainly, the infliction 
of the feeling one experiences when a hot oven is open is unnecessary 
beyond the point an arrestee no longer poses a safety threat.  If little or 
no physiological injury or no substantial psychological injury367 occurs, 
then a court that employs the de minimis injury exception or considers 
the quantum of injury sustained by the arrestee could nonetheless dismiss 
a case for want of injury. 
While requiring an indefinable quantum of injury is constitutionally 
deficient and impractical in light of future nonlethal weapons, the level 
of injury an arrestee sustains may nonetheless be relevant to excessive-
force claims.  Indeed, the jury system may give proper consideration to 
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the significance of an arrestee’s injury.  For example, a fact-finder may 
consider the extent of an arrestee’s injury when making a credibility 
determination.368  When considering the facts of the arrest as presented 
by the arrestee and comparing them with those presented by the police 
officer, the jury may well consider the extent of the arrestee’s injuries 
when evaluating the veracity of the competing stories.369  Similarly, if a 
fact-finder determines that the police officer used excessive force, then 
the fact-finder may consider the degree of physical or mental injury the 
arrestee sustained when apportioning damages.370  Under those 
circumstances, the fact-finder might decide that an arrestee incurred only 
minor injuries as a result of excessive force, thus necessitating a 
negligible damage award.  Recognizing the fact-finder’s function in this 
way ensures that free citizens who are subjected to excessive force, while 
perhaps not recovering a significant monetary award, will nonetheless 
have their constitutional rights vindicated. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
More than two decades ago, the Supreme Court determined that the 
Fourth Amendment governs arrestees’ excessive-force claims.371  The 
Court recognized that an analysis of the claim is rooted in what the very 
claim itself implies: the arresting police officer used more force than was 
necessary to make the arrest.372  Nevertheless, left to their own devices 
and not yet admonished by the Court, many circuit and district courts 
have included a review of the quantum of injury sustained by the 
arrestee.  While some circuit and district courts require that an arrestee 
allege more than a de minimis injury to have a meritorious claim, still 
other courts—and, at times, the same courts—require allegations of a 
more significant injury depending on the underlying facts of the case.  
The requirement of a preset, yet obscure, quantum of injury, however, 
ignores a citizen’s independent interest in being free from the state’s use 
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of excessive force and results in a hodgepodge of tests and 
considerations only a contortionist could navigate. 
In addition, the development and certain deployment of future 
nonlethal weapons by domestic police departments portends the practical 
difficulties of requiring some quantum of injury in Fourth Amendment 
excessive-force claims.  While the future of nonlethal weapons lies in the 
development of instruments that can cause intense pain, emotional 
distress, or even blindness, these weapons are designed to leave little or 
no evidence of their use.  Police officers who are outfitted with nonlethal 
weapons will rarely inflict the degree of harm necessary to overcome 
hurdles like the de minimis injury exception.  As a result, arrestees 
subjected to “diabolic or inhuman”373 force may very well find no 
judicial recourse when subjected to nonlethal weapons whose very 
purpose is to cause no evident injury.  The Supreme Court must reaffirm 
its decision in Graham and refocus Fourth Amendment excessive-force 
inquiries on whether the force the state used to detain a citizen was 
objectively reasonable under the circumstances. 
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